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I. INTRODUCTION
The world of investment credit is a shadow land where the
natural laws of reality function only erratically: it is a land where
barns are buildings but henhouses and silos are not, where easily
transportable objects are transformed through strange metaphysics
into inherently permanent structures. Much of the property in this
mysterious and seldom explored area of the law is "section 38 prop-
erty" and therefore eligible for the credit, but the search for the
characteristics serving to distinguish this elect property from less
favored assets may seem at times as fruitless as the quest for the
Philosopher's Stone.
IH. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Concept and Policy
The 1962 Revenue Act' created the Investment Credit by add-
ing section 38(a) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. That section
tersely provides that "[t]here shall be allowed, as a credit against
the tax imposed by this chapter, the amount determined under
subpart B of this part." Section 46(a) limits the amount of the credit
in most cases to 7 per cent of the "qualified investment."2 The credit
was enacted to stimulate the expansion of the economy, reflecting
a desire, as outlined in the President's 1962 Economic Report, to
1. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
2. The "qualified investment" is described in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 46(c) as the
aggregate of the "applicable percentage of the basis of ... new section 38 property" placed
in service during the taxable year, plus the "applicable percentage of the cost of. . .used
section 38 property" placed in service during that year.
The "applicable percentage" varies from a minimum of 33 1/3% for property with a useful
life of 3 to 5 years to 100% for property with a useful life of 7 years or more.
Unlike most other property, "public utility property" is limited to a 4% credit. This
property is defined as that used "predominantly in the trade or business of the furnishing
..electrical energy, water, or sewage disposal services, ... gas . . . or communications
services" in section 46(c)(3)(B).
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increase the profitability of productive investment by reducing the
net cost of acquiring new equipment.3 Investment in capacity ex-
pansion and modernization is encouraged by the credit in order to
spur an increase in production and output, thereby enhancing the
competitiveness of American exports in world markets.4 A strong
medicine for a flagging economy, the credit has been interrupted
during periods of boom to relieve inflationary pressures.5 The credit
was restored in its present form6 by the 1971 Revenue Act;7 it is
estimated that the credit saves business-and thereby costs the
Treasury-some four billion dollars annually.8 Thus the Commis-
sioner's attitude toward allowance of the credit is not always note-
worthy for expansive munificence.
B. Important Definitional Elements
Section 46(c) limits the credit to "section 38 property." This
crucial concept is defined in section 48(a)(1):
In general.- Except as provided in this subsection, the term "section 38
property" means-
(A) tangible personal property, or
(B) other tangible property (not including a building and its structural
components) but only if such property-
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or
extraction, or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical
energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services, or
(ii) constitutes a research facility used in connection with any of
the activities referred to in clause (i), or
(iii) constitutes a facility used in connection with any of the activi-
ties referred to in clause (i) for the bulk storage of fungible commodities
(including commodities in a liquid or gaseous state), or
(C) elevators and escalators...
Such term includes only property with respect to which depreciation (or amor-
tization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable and having a useful life (deter-
mined as of the time such property is placed in service) of 3 years or more.'
3. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962-3 CUM. BULL. 405, 411 [hereinafter
cited as 1962 REPORT]. Because the language of the Senate Report is virtually identical,
reference will be only to the House Report.
4. Id.
5. The credit was suspended in 1966, restored in 1967, suspended again in 1969, then
restored again in 1971. Eisner, Business Investment Preferences, 42 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 486,
489 (1974).
6. Among the changes introduced by the 1971 restoration were a shortening of the
required useful life for property to be credited from 4 years to 3, and the substitution of the
more precise phrase "a facility ... for the bulk storage of fungible commodities (including
commodities in a liquid or gaseous state)" for the rather vague term "storage facilities" in
section 48(a)(1).
7. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
8. Eisner, supra note 5, at 490 n.16.
9. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 48(a)(1).
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This definition appears deceptively simple; in fact, the determina-
tion of what is and what is not "section 38 property" is of labyrin-
thine complexity and subtlety. There have been over 100 published
revenue rulings and judicial decisions on the issue, characterized
chiefly by their ad hoc nature, conclusory reasoning, and, all too
often, inconsistency inter se. Congress' original mandate' that
words be given their ordinary meaning has become overgrown with
a thicket of tangled and often conflicting fictions. 1
Mindful that words may not mean what they seem to in the
twilight zone of the investment credit, we now examine the essential
concepts of section 48's definition of "section 38 property." The first
requirement for property to qualify is that it be depreciable, with a
useful life of more than three years.12 Within that framework almost
all 3 "tangible personal property" qualifies for the credit. "Tangible
personal property" is defined 4 in terms of that which it is not: all
property that is not intangible, and that is neither land nor an
improvement thereto such as buildings and other inherently perma-
nent structures; all property in the nature of machinery is specifi-
cally included as tangible personal property. 5
In addition, "other tangible property"-basically, realty and
improvements-may qualify for the credit. In order to qualify, how-
ever, this "other tangible property" must fall into one of four broad
categories relating to its function. The first category is property used
"as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extraction.
• . . The second qualifying class is other tangible property used
"as an integral part. . . of furnishing transportation, communica-
tions, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services" by
one engaged in the trade or business of furnishing such services." A
10. TECH. EXPLANATION OF H.R. REP. No. 1447, 1962-3 CUM. BULL. 503, 515.
[Hereinafter cited as 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION].
11. Compare the statement of 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION that "'building' is to be given
its commonly accepted meaning" with the recent Court of Claims rejection of any resort to
the dictionary definition of "building." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 74-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9592, at 84,911 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
12. As noted earlier, this requirement was revised downward in 1971 from four years.
See note 6 supra.
13. Section 48(a) excludes: most property used outside the United States except as
specifically provided in subsection 48(a)(2) (B); property used predominantly for the furnish-
ing of lodging, although property used by hotels and motels may qualify for the credit;
property used by certain tax-exempt organizations; property used by governmental organiza-
tions; horses (but not other livestock); property completed abroad or of predominantly foreign
origin; certain amortized property; and certain railroad track. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
48(a)(2)-(9).
14. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
15. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
16. This requirement is not found in section 48, but was apparently imported by the
regulations from the description of "public utility property" in section 46(c)(3)(B).
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third subdivision of qualifying "other tangible property" consists of
"research facilities used in connection with any of the activities...
[specified in either of the preceding categories]." The fourth type
of qualifying "other tangible property" is composed of facilities "for
the bulk storage of fungible commodities,"17 subject to the same use
restrictions as "research facilities." Though "buildings" and their
"structural components" might appear to be the paradigm exam-
ples of "other tangible property," they never qualify as section 38
property."8 Finally, elevators and escalators (which are beyond the
scope of this paper) also qualify if installed after June 30, 1963.
C. The Fundamental Conflict and Resultant Confusion
From the taxpayer's point of view, the most desirable charac-
terization for his property is "tangible personal property," because
that property is subject to neither the "integral part" nor "in
connection with" restrictions on use. Predictably, the Commissioner
has sought to constrict the reach of "tangible personal property"
while expanding the nonqualifying categories of "buildings" and
their "structural components." Between the ultraviolet of tangible
personal property and the infrared of buildings on the property spec-
trum, there is ample room for skirmishing over the nature of an
"inherently permanent structure," the meaning of an "integral part
of" "manufacturing, production, or extraction," the characteristics
of "storage facilities," or the existence of a bona fide "trade or
business" should the property at issue be involved in the furnishing
of electricity, water, or other service activities.
The employment of so many terms of art naturally makes for
very dense semantic undergrowth in this area. Moreover, the Com-
mittee reports specifically provided that local law should not be the
controlling definitional source."2 Unfettered by state law, the Com-
missioner's broad power to promulgate the regulations under which
the credit is to be administered" provides him with a distinct ad-
vantage in the struggles over the characterization and interpretation
of section 38 property. The Service has the definitional power to
17. The original enactment merely referred to "storage facilities." Revenue Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). There is some
controversy over the extent to which this 1971 change of diction really changed the law. See
text following note 186 infra.
18. The problem of distinguishing between nonqualifying "buildings" and "facilities for
bulk storage" or other "inherently permanent structures," which do qualify, will be discussed
at length. See text following note 159 infra.
19. See 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 415.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 38(b) provides:
"(b) Regulations.-The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section and subpart B."
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create a semantic framework providing wide space for maneuvering
between various tests it creates, and has so employed this power.
Not all of the tests formulated by the regulations and rulings seem
entirely consistent with one another;2 indeed, on occasion the Serv-
ice has been apprehended by the courts in the embarrassing act of
taking a position directly contradicting an earlier position.2 Sadly,
neither are the courts innocent of the sin of inconsistency.3
Although it may be dangerously premature to speak of trends
in an area as factually oriented as the definition of section 38 prop-
erty, it seems fair to conclude on balance that, in categorizing an
item of property for investment credit purposes, both the Commis-
sioner and the courts are placing increasing emphasis on a consider-
ation of the item's function rather than its forms and appearance.
There is much to recommend this sort of approach: it may provide
a better clue than does appearance for ascertaining whether an item
is "in the nature of machinery," and, as the law has developed, it
is the only way to distinguish a qualifying storage facility from a
nonqualifying warehouse. But there are also difficulties with an
increased emphasis on function: an improper mix of considerations
in a close case may lead to a conclusion that a structure which to
the common understanding is a building is, nevertheless, not a
"building" in the statutory sense because of some peculiar function,
thus giving rise to a technical and fictitious distinction. Addition-
ally, there are situations in which a strict functional approach may
produce a plainly inappropriate result, such as the characterization
of a temporary metal room divider as a structural component by
comparing its function to that of a wall, totally ignoring the absence
of the important attribute of permanence.2 4 Thus it is an oversimpli-
fication to conclude, as some have done, that a bare functional
analysis can provide all the answers to the perplexing questions
lurking within the definition of section 38 property.
In addition to the pervading inconsistencies of interpretation
and dispute over the proper place of "function," the third major
problem in the area is with lacunae in the regulations. By and large,
the network of interrelating concepts in the definitional regulation
21. For example, in the area of "buildings" the Service has frequently zig-zagged be-
tween an appearance test and a functional approach, whichever seemed more advantageous,
on the apparent assumption that it is more difficult to hit a moving rationale. See note 215
et seq. infra and accompanying text.
22. Minot Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368, 1370-72 (8th Cir.
1970). Compare Joseph B. Weirick, 62 T.C. 446 (1974) with Beverly R. Roberts, 60 T.C. 861
(1973).
23. Compare Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968) with Merchants Refrigerating Co.,
60 T.C. 856 (1973) and Palmer Olson, 1970 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. T 70,296.
24. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
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provides satisfactory interfaces at the points where those concepts
touch or stand as exceptions to one another. Nevertheless, there are
some gaps where concepts such as "in the nature of machinery" cut
across "inherently permanent structure," "building," and "tangible
personal property."
III. "TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY"
A. Legislative History and Regulations
If property is identified as "tangible personal property," it
qualifies as section 38 property regardless of its use or the nature of
the taxpayer's activity. The Code does not define tangible personal
property, yet this is probably the largest class of items qualifying
as section 38 property. The House Ways and Means Committee
Report for the 1962 Revenue Act25 indicates that the term "is not
intended to be defined narrowly . . . nor to necessarily follow the
rules of state law."26 Therefore the vagaries and complexities of the
local law of fixtures are not to be controlling:
It is intended that assets accessory to a business such as grocery store
counters, printing presses, individual air-conditioning units, etc., even though
fixtures under local law, are to qualify for the credit. Similarly, assets of a
mechanical nature, even though located outside a building, such as gasoline
pumps, are to qualify for the credit."
The language of the Senate Report is identical. 2 This language
plainly indicates that tangible personal property is to be defined
more broadly for the investment credit than for purposes of local
law. The Technical Explanations to the Committee Reports 2 state
that tangible personal property includes any tangible property ex-
cept land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other
"inherently permanent structures" and the "structural compo-
nents" of such buildings or structures." The Technical Explana-
tions add "transportation or office equipment, refrigerators . . .
testing equipment, display racks and shelves" to the enumerated
examples of assets accessory to the operation of a business." The
same section, describing items "in the nature of machinery" (a
slight, but, significant, 2 change of diction from "of a mechanical
25. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 405.
26. Id. at 415.
27. Id. at 415-16.
28. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962-3 CUM. BuLL. 707, 722.
29. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 515.
30. Id. at 515-16.
31. Id.
32. For example, it is doubtful that the argument over the status of the line towers
mounting pulleys and sheave assemblies at a ski lift would have arisen in Weirick had the
1975]
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nature") includes hydraulic car lifts and gasoline pumps as exam-
ples. Intangibles, such as patents and copyrights, do not qualify.3
The regulation's basic definition of tangible personal property34
amplifies the Committee Reports and Technical Explanations:
[T]he term "tangible personal property" means any tangible property
except land and improvements thereto, such as buildings or other inherently
permanent structures (including items which are structural components of
such buildings or structures) .... Tangible personal property includes all
property (other than structural components) which is contained in or attached
to a building.n
But whereas the Committee Reports' statements that local law
should not be controlling seem to have been intended to broaden the
scope of tangible personal property by liberating it from state fix-
ture law,3 the regulations make plain that the concept's independ-
ence from local law cuts both ways:
Local law shall not be controlling for purposes of determining whether
property is or is not "tangible" or "personal." Thus, the fact that under local
law property is held to be personal property or tangible property shall not be
controlling.3
7
Further, while the regulation supplies few additional examples of
the sort of property which does qualify as tangible personal prop-
erty,"8 it is quick to list numerous illustrations of nonqualifying
property: swimming pools, paved parking areas, wharves and docks,
bridges and fences. The Service's clear purpose is to restrict the
scope of tangible property.
B. Classes of "Tangible Personal Property"
(1) Items Contained in or Attached to a Building
The most prolific class of tangible personal property is "prop-
erty (other than structural components) which is contained in or
attached to a building. '3 The first revenue ruling" dealing with
language of the regulations been "mechanical" rather than "machinery." For a fuller discus-
sion of this case, see notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text.
33. 1962 TEcH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 516.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
35. Id.
36. See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975). The regulations do concede, however, that "property
may be personal property for purposes of the investment credit even though under local law
the property is considered to be a fixture and therefore real property." Id. It is significant
that this concession follows, rather than precedes, the in terrorem remark that the Service
does not feel bound by a local determination that property is personalty.
38. In addition to those items in the text following note 30 supra, the regulations
mention only neon signs and automatic vending machines. Id.
39. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
40. Rev. Rul. 65-79, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 26.
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section 38 property adopted a rather cooperative position on what
would and would not be excluded from tangible personal property
because a "structural component." Responding to a query from a
bank, the Service declared that bank vault doors, night depository
facilities, and both walk-up and drive-up tellers' windows would be
considered tangible personal property and thus eligible for the
credit. The Service reasoned that because all of the aforementioned
property could be removed without affecting the bank's operation
"as a building," the property must perforce be "equipment," rather
than "structural components."4 Further, since these specialized
doors and windows were commonly used throughout the banking
industry, "they must be considered as items accessorial to the con-
duct of the banking business, and therefore 'tangible personal
property.' "42
This first approach, basically asking "does the property relate
to the general functions common to all buildings (lights, etc.), or to
the specialized activity carried on in this building (bank vault
doors, tellers' windows and other 'accessorial' items)," was subse-
quently applied to find that the seats in a baseball stadium were
tangible personal property in Revenue Ruling 69-170.11 The Service
there observed that although the stadium was a "building," the
seats were: "neither essential parts of the 'building', nor [were]
they items that relate to the operation or maintenance of the build-
ing. Rather, they relate to the operation of the taxpayer's business
of presenting [baseball] . . . ."" For the same reasons, the flag-
pole, backstop, scoreboard, and message board mounted at various
points on the same structure qualified as tangible personal property,
by analogy to the example in the regulations of neon signs mounted
on buildings.45 This rather liberal test has not been universally ap-
plied, however;" indeed, that ruling marked its last public appear-
ance.
Another key for distinguishing tangible personal property con-
tained in a building from the structural components thereof is the
relative permanence of attachment to the building.47 Revenue Rul-
41. Id. at 27-28.
42. Id. at 28.
43. 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 28.
44. Id.
45. The ruling went on to draw a most unconvincing distinction between items attached
to the stadium and identical items which happened to be set in the ground inside the stadium,
terming the latter equipment "inherently permanent structures." Id. at 29. See text accom-
panying note 98 infra.
46. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-3, 1974 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 1, at 11 (enclosures for inventoried
parts in a warehouse); Rev. Rul. 68-405, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 35 (extra-heavy insulation).
47. This factor is also a key consideration in identifying an "inherently permanent
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ing 67-34911 concluded that wall-to-wall carpeting installed in cer-
tain areas of a motel could qualify for the credit as tangible personal
property. Unlike paneling permanently attached to a wall, the car-
pet was neither an integral part of nor permanently affixed to the
floor, and was not therefore a structural component. In its zeal to
control the credit, however, the Service for a time moved away from
this eminently reasonable approach, replacing the stress on perman-
ence with an emphasis on analogy of use: if the item performs the
same function as a structural component, then it should be consid-
ered one (the argument went) regardless of its lack of permanence.49
This "analogy of function" test has met with a uniformly inhospita-
ble reception in the courts,5" and the Service has recently shown
signs of abandoning it for a return to the "permanence" analysis.',
(2) Items "in the Nature of Machinery": A Troublesome
Ambiguity
Building from the statement in the Committee Reports that
items of a "mechanical nature"52 are to be considered tangible per-
sonal property, the regulations include items "in the nature of
machinery" as qualifying tangible personal property, whether at-
tached to a building or affixed to the ground. Examples of such
property are the pumps and portable sprinkling equipment for a golf
course,53 and certain equipment for washing the movable windows
at a racetrack grandstand. 4 In Hayden Island, Inc. ,55 a semiportable
sewage treatment plant was held to be tangible personal property
because of its mechanical nature, and because it was designed to be
moved from place to place without great difficulty. 6
Because the regulations characterize "inherently permanent
structures" not as tangible personal property but as "other tangible
structure." It was several years before this rather basic conclusion was reached, however.
See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
48. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 48, 49.
49. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-14, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 26 (movable partitions are "structural
components").
50. See King Radio Corp. v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9766, at 82,481 (10th
Cir. 1973); Minot Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970).
51. See Rev. Rul. 74-391, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 33, at 6 (emphasizing the perman-
ence of a wood-block floor in denying the credit).
52. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 416.
53. Rev. Rul. 69-273, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 30. This ruling denied the credit for the pipe
and valve system, however. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
54. Rev. Rul. 69-614, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 8. The credit was denied, though, for the
equipment that raised the windows.
55. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9604 (D. Ore. 1974).
56. The water and sewer lines connected to the treatment machinery were held to be
"other tangible property," however. Id. at 84,944.
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property,"5 what should be the result when an item "in the nature
of machinery" is also "inherently permanent"? Is it tangible per-
sonal property, or other tangible property? The regulations do not
address this problem, and the Service skirted it in Revenue Ruling
69-169 .5 That ruling held the cable support towers59 of a ski lift were
inherently permanent structures, and thus other tangible property,
but the Service did not mention any mechanical characteristics of
the towers. In Beverly Roberts," however, the ambiguity was pre-
sented more squarely. The property in question was the massive
steel tower of an amusement ride known as the "Astro-Needle." At
the top of the tower there was machinery for hoisting and rotating
an observation gondola. The Commissioner convinced the Tax
Court that even if the Astro-Needle were regarded as a type of
machinery, its status as an inherently permanent structure pre-
vented it from qualifying as personal property.6'
The issue soon arose again in Joseph B. Weirick,2 in which the
taxpayer contested the conclusion in Revenue Ruling 69-16911 that
ski lift support towers were nonqualifying "other tangible property"
because of their inherently permanent status. 4 The Commissioner
had conceded during the course of the litigation that the drive and
tension towers at either end of the lift, even though "inherently
permanent," could qualify as tangible personal property because
they were also "in the nature of machinery"; nevertheless, he main-
tained that the support towers between the terminals were not of
that nature despite the inconvenient fact that the support towers
housed certain pulley apparatus necessary for the operation of the
lift. The Tax Court noted the inconsistency between the concession
that the terminal towers were personal property regardless of per-
manence, and the position taken the year before in Roberts that
"permanence" controlled over "machinery" to make such struc-
tures "other tangible property."65 The court concluded that since
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
58. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 27.
59. The cable support towers are the towers located between the two terminal towers.
The ruling did not deal with the proper classification of the terminal towers that support
motors, gear assemblies, and lift controls.
60. 60 T. C. 861 (1973).
61. The court stated: "Even if the 'Astro-Needle' might be regarded as a type of 'machi-
nery', to hold that such a formidable structure was not 'inherently permanent' would obliter-
ate the distinction between 'personal property' and 'other tangible property'." Id. at 866.
62. 62 T.C. 446 (1974).
63. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
64. The taxpayer strenuously argued that the property be characterized "tangible
personal property" because the operation of a ski lift is not a "transportation" activity
which would qualify "other tangible property" for the credit. Rev. Rul. 69-13, 1969-1 CUM.
BULL. 25.
65. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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the intervening support towers had no more inherent permanence
than the terminal towers, and since the whole lift functioned as a
unitary mechanism, all the towers must be tangible personal prop-
erty, even though inherently permanent structures, because they
constituted property in the nature of machinery."
One hopes that the Commissioner's future position, in the in-
terest of clarity, will be that which he expressed as the concession
on the terminal towers in Weirick: inherently permanent structures
in the nature of machinery are to be considered tangible personal
property. Certainly this interpretation seems more consonant with
the expressed congressional purpose of encouraging investment in
equipment by broadly construing the reach of tangible personal
property. Nevertheless, until there is a formal reaction from the
Treasury to Weirick, the status of equipment which is both an in-
herently permanent structure and in the nature of machinery will
remain unclear.
C. Conclusion: Tangible Personal Property
To recapitulate, it seems that the original congressional intent
that tangible personal property be construed broadly, reinforced by
an early ruling dealing with property used at a bank, has become
somewhat overgrown by subsequent rulings intended to narrow the
reach of this happiest (because immune from use restrictions) of
property categories for taxpayers. Although the Committee Reports
probably intended to broaden tangible personal property by freeing
the concept from state fixture law, the regulations ominously note
that a characterization of property as "personal" under state law is
not controlling either, thus narrowing the concept. The Commis-
sioner has further narrowed the tangible personal property category
by quietly failing to recognize or assert the liberal "accessorial to the
business" test for items found within a building. Nevertheless,
items contained in or attached to a building remain the most com-
prehensive class of tangible personal property. The largest headache
in the area is caused by confusion over the proper relationship be-
tween the statement in section 1.48-1(c) of the Regulations that "all
property which is in the nature of machinery (other than structural
components. . .)" is considered tangible personal property and the
statement in the same section that "'tangible personal property'
means any tangible property except . . . inherently permanent
structures." Weirick holds that the first-quoted passage controls
over the second; Roberts holds the opposite. The briefs in Weirick
66. 62 T.C. at 451.
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indicate that the Commissioner is as confused as everyone else over
the proper resolution of this issue.
IV. OTHER TANGIBLE PROPERTY
A. Legislative History and Regulations
"Other tangible property" is basically all real property except
buildings and their structural components." Whereas tangible per-
sonal property will generally qualify for the investment credit re-
gardless of the nature of the taxpayer's activity,8 "other tangible
property" must be used as an "integral part" of "manufacturing,
production, or extraction" or of "furnishing transportation, commu-
nications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services";
or the property must qualify as a "research facility" or "facility for
the bulk storage of fungible commodities" used "in connection
with" any of the aforementioned activities. The regulations distin-
guish between property used as an integral part of "manufactur-
ing, production, or extraction" and that used as part of "furnishing
transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or
sewage disposal services" by appending to the latter category the
requirement that the user of the property be engaged in the trade
or business of furnishing these services. 9
The Committee Report lists blast furnaces, railroad tracks and
signals, oil and gas pipelines, and fences as examples of "other
tangible property,"70 importing the common-law notion that items
affixed to the land should be considered realty, not personalty. The
decision to give new life to this quaint archaism, coupled with the
statement that "items of a mechanical nature" were to be consid-
ered personalty,7 certainly does not simplify the identification of
section 38 property. Often, of course, there is no difficulty in deter-
mining whether an item is, or is not, personal property: a road, for
example, clearly is not.73 But as items on land physically rise above
it and their metaphysical unity with the earth becomes more atten-
uated, problems arise.
67. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 415.
68. It will qualify for the investment unless it falls within one of the proscribed catego-
ries listed in §§ 48(a)(2)-(9). See note 13 supra.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(1) (1975).
70. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 416.
71. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
72. One may wonder why the signal apparatus at a railroad crossing is not an item of
'mechanical nature." A clean break with the common-law past might have been preferable.
73. A roadway used solely by trucks in transporting raw materials for the taxpayer's
business can qualify for the credit, but roadways designed for general use cannot. Rev. Rul.
71-555, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 65.
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B. Distinguishing "Other Tangible Property" from "Tangible
Personal Property"
(1) Improvements to Land
The earliest test to be elucidated for distinguishing between
tangible personal property and other tangible property was the
"improvement to land" test. Revenue Ruling 65-30811 labeled gas
mains "other tangible property" since they were "improvements
added to land in the form of inherently permanent structures which
are placed in or upon land. 7 5 The Ruling did not expound on the
concept of "inherently permanent structure," but the result reached
seems plainly in accord with the expressed intention of the Commit-
tee Reports, as are the conclusions that steam mains, 7 water wells,7"
paved barnyards, 78 and tiled drainage 0ditches71 also constitute
"other tangible property."
The Service applied the same approach in Revenue Ruling 69-
273,80 concluding that the underground pipe and valve network of a
golf course sprinkling system must be "other tangible property."
While the analogy between water pipes and steam pipes is apparent,
it must be noted that the sprinklers themselves, as well as the
pumps, were classified as qualifying tangible personal property. It
would seem equally reasonable to have treated the entire sprinkling
system as a unitary mechanism; it seems somewhat simplistic to
conclude that merely because an item is buried it must be consid-
ered an improvement to land as an inherently permanent structure.
Nevertheless, it remains the Service's position that subterranean
items are usually inherently permanent structures,8' and this propo-
sition generally has been sustained by the courts. 2
An example of improvements to the surface of the land is the
earthen boarding ramp of a ski lift.83 The category of improvements
to land as a standard for determining what is the other tangible
property also includes "improvements to water." For example,
74. 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 74. This ruling dealt with a § 179 problem, but applied the
principles developed under the investment credit.
75. Id.
76. Rev. Rul. 68-184, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 7, 8.
77. Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 7, 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 30. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-152, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 14, at 8 (underground storage
tanks for gasoline).
82. E.g., Tejas Properties, Inc. v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9240 (E.D. Tex.
1970); C.C. Everhart, 61 T.C. 328, 331 (1973).
83. Joseph B. Weirick, 62 T.C. 446 (1974).
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docks,"' permanent pilings,85 piers,8" mooring cells,8" a lobster pound
extending into an inlet,88 dams,89 and various pools, fish ladders, and
other paraphenalia for keeping fish from being minced in the tur-
bines at a hydroelectric dam"° have all been classed as improve-
ments to land.
(2) "Inherently Permanent Structures": The Three Tests
Property which constitutes "improvements to land" is not the
only category of other tangible property. An "inherently permanent
structure," whether or not an obvious improvement to land, is also
other tangible property. An obvious example of an "inherently per-
manent structure" is a building; however, buildings never qualify
for the credit, if they are "buildings" within the statutory sense."
What, then, is an "inherently permanent (non-'building')
structure"? One test often invoked by the Service to answer this
question might be called the "annexation" test. Under this test, the
Service takes the position that a solidly constructed structure, al-
though movable, is "other tangible property" because attached, and
therefore annexed, to the realty. In many cases, the results seem
sound. For example, in Revenue Ruling 68-62 2 billboards were held
to be realty because of their size and secure affixation to the ground.
Although one may incline to skepticism concerning the continued
utility of the common law of structures as realty, the result in that
ruling does no violence to the policy of the investment credit. 3
Similarly, the Service classified the line towers of a chair lift
as inherently permanent structures because of their sturdy con-
struction. 4 The reasoning expressed in Revenue Ruling 68-345,11
however, is less compelling. The Commissioner there ruled that
metal canopies erected over the pump islands at filling stations,
84. Rev. Rul. 67-67, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 6 (dictum).
85. Estate of Shirley Morgan, 52 T.C. 478, 483 (1969), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
86. Rev. Rul. 68-280, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 20.
87. Rev. Rul. 68-211, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 17.
88. Rev. Rul. 68-279, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 18.
89. Rev. Rul. 73-420, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 9.
90. Rev. Rul. 73-466, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 52.
91. The statute specifically excludes buildings and their structural components in §
48(a)(1)(B). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
92. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 365. This was a § 1245 issue, but investment credit principles
were applied.
93. It is difficult to discern precisely what connection there might be between fostering
the effacement of the landscape through billboards and expanding this country's capital
expenditures to enable our goods to compete successfully overseas.
94. Rev. Rul. 69-169, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 277. See, however, the discussion in the text
following note 62 supra.
95. 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 30.
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though designed for simple removal, were ineligible96 "other tangi-
ble property." Despite the ease of disassembly, the Ruling neverthe-
less maintained that the canopies' function while erected was that
of a permanent structure providing shelter, thus removing them
from the category of personal property. Even less convincing than
that ruling are some of the conclusions expressed in Revenue Ruling
69-170,11 dealing with various components of a modern baseball
stadium. The Service allowed the credit for flagpoles, backstops,
and various lighted signs (not including the field lights) affixed to
the stadium itself as tangible personal property, 8 but refused to
allow it for flagpoles, screens, and electric signs attached to the
ground; the Ruling's reasoning was that these free-standing compo-
nents must be nonqualifying inherently permanent structures, sim-
ply because they were attached to the earth rather than to a build-
ing.9 This seems to be a distinction without a difference. One won-
ders whether, following this approach, a giant amusement slide
ruled ineligible for the credit as an inherently permanent structure '
might have qualified as tangible personal property had it been
erected inside, and therefore attached to, some building such as a
fun house.
The conclusion in the baseball stadium Ruling was in itself a
departure from and inconsistent with a previous statement in Reve-
nue Ruling 67-231e1 that the matter of annexation to the ground or
attachment to a building was not a controlling factor. That 1967
Ruling had held that an outdoor lighting facility was an inherently
permanent structure, not tangible personal property, despite the
fact that the facility was both easily removable and attached to a
building. As noted earlier, the Service disallowed the credit for the
field lights in the baseball Ruling, even though they were affixed to
the stadium structure; apparently the Service believed that consist-
ency of result was more important than consistency of reasoning.
Reading the two Rulings together, one must reach the logically un-
satisfactory conclusion that while attachment to a building rather
than the ground may save an item from classification as other tangi-
ble property because an inherently permanent structure, sometimes
96. The canopies were ineligible for the credit because the retail sale of gasoline does
not fall within "manufacturing, production, or extraction, or of furnishing transportation,
communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services," and therefore the
use requirements for "other tangible property" were not complied with. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 48(a)(1)(B).
97. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 28.
98. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
99. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 28, 29.
100. Rev. Rul. 71-377, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 63.
101. 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 5,6.
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it will not; further, outdoor lighting facilities, no matter where at-
tached, can never be personal property. Perhaps wisely, the Com-
missioner has not recently referred to either of these Rulings.
The Tax Court, attempting to inject some consistency into the
inherently permanent structure confusion, observed in Roberts"°2
that the controlling factor should not be whether the item in ques-
tion was affixed to the land, but the manner and permanence of the
arrangement."3 Thus, the concrete base supporting an observation
tower was declared an inherently permanent structure, since it was
sunk into the soil and was unlikely to be moved without great effort.
The same approach was borrowed for use in a section 179 problem
in Kenneth D. La Croix,"0 4 which held that citrus trees were not
tangible personal property because of their permanence.'
The Tax Court has also made clear, to the Commissioner's
chagrin, that the inquiry into the nature and permanence of annexa-
tion works both ways. In Estate of Shirley Morgan,"'8 the Commis-
sioner took the position that a series of floating docks 07 were inher-
ently permanent structures because of their attachment to the
realty. Specifically, he pointed out that the docks were annexed to
the land by the pilings anchoring them in place, by the gangway
connecting the dock to the shoreline, and by plumbing and electri-
cal power hookups.' The court dismissed the argument that a find-
ing of technical annexation ended the inquiry, choosing instead to
examine the significance of the attachment. Noting that the docks
were easily removed from the pilings, that the gangways were
merely rolled onto the docks, and that the plumbing and electrical
lines were easily disconnected, the court concluded that the requi-
site permanence was lacking, and that the docks were indeed per-
sonal property.'
In Joseph H. Moore,"' the Service argued that mobile homes
102. 60 T.C. at 861. See also text accompanying note 47 supra.
103. 60 T.C. at 866.
104. 61 T.C. 471, 487 (1974).
105. As in Roberts, however, the La Croix court observed that the mere fact of annexa-
tion to the realty did not, without more, prevent an object from being considered tangible
personal property.
106. 52 T.C. 478, 483-84 (1969).
107. The walkways of the docks were kept in position by wooden pilings passing through
openings in the walkways and sunk into the floor of the estuary; the walkways floated up and
down with the nine foot tides, and could easily be moved to another location if desired.
108. The Service also advanced the argument that the docks should be considered
"inherently permanent structures" because of their use. See note 114 infra and accompanying
text.
109. By contrast, the court concluded that the pilings did exhibit the requisite degree
of permanence.
110. 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff'd, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9146 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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in a trailer park were rendered inherently permanent structures by
their attachment to the realty through utility connections. The Tax
Court held otherwise, concluding that this trivial attachment was
outweighed by the ease with which a mobile home could be trans-
ported from place to place, preventing it from becoming a "perma-
nent" structure. Similar conclusions have been reached with regard
to a transportable sewage processing plant"' and movable wooden
boarding ramps at a chair lift."2 In short, the Commissioner has
been quite unsuccessful in his attempts to convince the courts that
the simple fact of attachment compels the "inherently permanent"
conclusion; instead, an object which is intended to be moved, or
which could be moved without undue effort may well be labeled
personal property by the courts.
The Commissioner has also sought to employ a "functional"
test to find that an item is an inherently permanent structure and
thus other tangible property for investment credit purposes. Al-
though this approach has had considerable success on other issues
concerning the section 38 property controversy (most notably on the
issue of .whether an item is a "building" or a "structural compo-
nent")"I it has been met with judicial skepticism in this area. Basi-
cally, the Commissioner's argument has been that if the property
in question is used in the same manner as or in place of a more
familiar object which is concededly permanent, then the property
under consideration must also be deemed an inherently permanent
structure. In Revenue Ruling 67-67'"1 and in Estate of Shirley
Morgan"5 the Commissioner contended that since the floating docks
were employed in place of similar nonfloating (and therefore ob-
viously permanent) berthing facilities, this use should result in
"inherently permanent" treatment for floating docks."' Rejecting
the proffered analogy, the Tax Court held that the permanence of a
particular item was to be evaluated with reference to that item's
own intrinsic nature, and that similarity of function could not be
employed to impose a sort of constructive permanence on an item
which was essentially impermanent. This is an eminently sensible
resolution.
111. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
112. Joseph B. Weirick, 62 T.C. 446, 449 (1974).
113. See text following notes 233 & 308, infra.
114. 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 6.
115. 52 T.C. 478, 483 (1969).
116. Similarly, in Rev. Rul. 67-156, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 7, and in Joseph H. Moore, 58
T.C. 1045 (1972), the Service took the position that the use of a motor vehicle trailer as a
laundrette or home in place of and in the same manner as a more permanent structure
required the trailers to be treated as buildings.
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(3) Property of an "Inherently Permanent Nature"
One final formulation for other tangible property is property of
an "inherently permanent nature." Like "inherently permanent
structure," the term is vague; but unlike "inherently permanent
structure," it does not appear in the regulations, nor is it amplified
by any substantial body of rulings and decisions. Instead, it appears
to be a stopgap term reserved for situations not fitting any of the
other, better defined, formulations. It was applied in Revenue Rul-
ing 70-103,117 to characterize walls, doors, restrooms, plumbing, off-
ice partitions, flooring, and electrical fixtures added and employed
by the taxpayer to convert a worked-out limestone mine to a ware-
housing area. Normally, such items would fall into the category of
"structural components of buildings or other inherently permanent
structures,""' 8 but here the Service apparently was not willing to
label an old mine as a "building" or a "structure." Equally reluc-
tant, however, to let these items escape as tangible personal prop-
erty, the Service coined the term "items of an inherently permanent
nature" to conclude that they were other tangible property. The
result in the Ruling seems correct, but one wonders if the Service
will be able to resist the temptation to expand this presently vague
rubric into yet another test for removing property from the personal
classification and thus denying the credit.
C. Determining What "Other Tangible Property" Qualifies for the
Credit
(1) Elements of the "Integral Part" Test
Assuming that an item has been classified as "other tangible
property" for whatever reason, it yet may qualify for the credit if it
is used "as an integral part" of certain specified activities. The
original Committee Reports do not define the meaning of "integral
part," although they do mention "blast furnaces, oil and gas pipe-
lines, railroad track and signals, and fences used in connection with
raising of cattle" as examples of qualifying items."' The regulations
clarify the matter somewhat, stating that:
Property is used as an integral part of one of the specified activities if it
is used directly in the activity and is essential to the completeness of the
117. 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 6.
118. See generally text following note 308 infra.
119. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 416. The use of the term "in connection with" in
describing qualifying fences was probably inadvertent, since fences are subject to the more
stringent "integral part" test. The error was corrected in the Technical Explanations, which
made clear that these fences should be used "as an integral part" of an activity. 1962 TECH.
EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 517.
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activity. Thus, for example, in determining whether property is used as an
integral part of manufacturing, all properties used by the taxpayer in acquiring
or transporting raw materials or supplies to the point where the actual process-
ing commences (such as docks, railroad tracks and bridges), or in processing
raw materials into the taxpayer's final product, would be considered as prop-
erty used as an integral part of manufacturing.' 21
Generally, the Service has been reasonably liberal in applying
its "used directly in, and essential to the completeness of' test on
the question of "integral part." For example, the storage tanks,
loading and unloading docks, various racks and pumps for filling
trucks, and the paved yard of an oil blending facility were all held
to be integral parts of the blending process. 121 In other rulings, the
Service has allowed the credit for a mooring cell used by a barge
company to provide a temporary anchorage point, 122 safety devices
such as concrete firewalls constructed around gasoline storage tanks
at a refinery,'2 wells (whether lined or not) and drainage facilities
constructed on a farm,14 test tracks constructed by an automobile
manufacturer for evaluating new prototypes,2s and paved areas at
an airport for parking aircraft. 26 The Service, reversing an earlier
hostility toward allowing the credit for such expenditures, 27 has
even permitted the credit for land preparation costs, if so closely
associated with other qualifying assets that they must be replaced
contemporaneously with those assets. 28
Assets such as blast furnaces would always seem to meet the
integral part test, but other types of property, such as roads and
parking areas, require more careful examination. Here, the Service
interprets the integral part test to require employment of facilities
predominantly by vehicles actually engaged in the qualifying activ-
ity. Thus, roadways and parking areas within a manufacturing com-
plex used solely, or regularly, by trucks transporting raw materials
qualify; 12 however, similar facilities used predominantly as parking
facilities for employee and visitor convenience do not qualify, even
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(4) (1975). The regulations add telephone poles,
broadcasting towers, and oil derricks to the list of qualifying property given in the original
Committee Reports. Id.
121. Rev. Rul. 74-204, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 18, at 7.
122. Rev. Rul 68-211, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 17. The loading and unloading activities did
not take place at these mooring cells, but the Service was not disposed to make difficulties
because of this.
123. Rev. Rul. 68-347, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 33.
124. Rev. Rul. 72-272, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 17; Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 7.
125. Rev. Rul. 72-267, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 18,19.
126. Rev. Rul. 69-329, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
127. The Commissioner had unsuccessfully taken a more hostile position in Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1971).
128. Rev. Rul. 72-96, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 67.
129. Rev. Rul. 71-555, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 65.
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though used in the operation of the business, because of insufficient
nexus with the manufacturing, production, or extraction. ' Fences
are another category of property whose qualification as an integral
part is subject to a somewhat stricter burden of persuasion. Fences
employed in agricultural activities to control the movement of live-
stock will qualify, 3' as will guardrails serving an analogous function
in the containment of vehicular traffic at a marshalling yard. 32 The
Service finds a distinction, however, between fences thus employed
and those erected merely as barriers to unauthorized entry, classify-
ing the latter as "incidental."' 33 Outdoor lighting facilities are an-
other special case, and will qualify only on proof of substantial
nocturnal activity necessitating artificial lighting.
It should be noted that the Service takes the position that
"used directly in, and essential to, the completeness of" an activity
is to be interpreted in terms of systemic integration; that is, if an
item is to be an integral part of a process, it must be because the
mechanics of the process itself, rather than external factors, require
its inclusion. Thus Revenue Ruling 73-466'11 concluded that certain
fish preservation facilities constructed at a hydroelectric plant pur-
suant to Federal Power Commission order'1 were not used as an
integral part of furnishing energy, even though the taxpayer had no
choice but to comply with the agency order and therefore could not
have operated the hydroelectric facility without the fish ladders. On
the other hand, it would seem that some sort of system intended to
prevent fish from entering and damaging the turbines would have
qualified as an integral part of furnishing electric power, being nec-
essary for the proper functioning of the generating system.
Although there was controversy in the area for some time, the
reach of "manufacturing, production, or extraction" is now an even
quieter front than the "integral part" issue. The Committee Reports
made no effort to define those terms, but the Technical Explana-
tions indicate that the terms are to be given their commonly ac-
130. Rev. Rul. 72-397, 1972-2 CUM. BuLL. 8; see note 123 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, fire prevention measures may not always qualify: as noted earlier, firewalls at a
refinery were approved, but fire hydrants emplaced at a marine terminal were disqualified
in a questionable ruling dismissing them as "general land improvements" not sufficiently
related to the terminal's activity. Rev. Rul. 68-280, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 20. It is true that the
terminal probably could function without its fire hydrants, but to define "integral part" so
narrowly that it is tantamount to "sine qua non" seems altogether too niggardly.
131. Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 7.
132. Rev. Rul. 68-280, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 20.
133. Id. at 21; Rev. Rul. 68-1, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 8.
134. 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 52.
135. The facilities involved consisted of an entrance pool, a fish ladder, a holding pool,
a mechanism for lifting fish from the holding pool into trucks, water pipes, and a collection
pool.
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cepted meanings. Further, the Explanations include within "manu-
facturing and production" all activities involving the construction,
reconstruction, or making of property
from or with scrap, salvage, or junk material, as well as from new or raw
material, (1) by processing, manipulating, refining, or changing the form of an
article, or (2) by combining or assembling two or more articles, and includes
the cultivation of the soil and the raising of livestock and other farm produce."'
The regulations repeat the quoted language and set forth an exten-
sive list of activities illustrating the scope of "manufacturing, pro-
duction, or extraction." ' The Service's position is quite liberal. At
one point the Commissioner did take the position that the blending
of two different grades of oil to produce a third was a "service" not
comprehended by manufacturing or production, but discovered in
Northville Dock Corp. 138 that the Tax Court was prepared to inter-
pret these terms more liberally. The court concluded that the blend-
ing fell within "the making of property by changing the form of an
article, or by combining or assembling two or more articles." '39 The
Commissioner later accepted this interpretation in Revenue Ruling
74-204.110
The Technical Explanations to the 1962 Revenue Act indicate
that "transportation," "communications," "electrical energy,"
"gas," "water," or "sewage disposal" are also to be given their com-
monly accepted meanings in determining whether a taxpayer's op-
erations fall within them.141 Unlike manufacturing, production, or
extraction, however, the Explanations provide that property will not
be considered employed as an integral part of one of these service
activities unless the property is used by one engaged in the trade or
business of furnishing such services.1 2 This additional requirement
is found also in the regulations, although it did not appear in so
136. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 516. The TECH. EXPLANATION lists as
examples of such activities: "extraction, processing, refining, and fabrication of minerals or
mineral products; the growing, raising, processing, and packing or packaging of foodstuffs;
the operation of sawmills and the production of lumber and lumber products and other
building materials, and the manufacture, treatment, and packaging of textiles, paper, leather
goods, glass, etc." Id. at 516-17.
137. The list in the regulations includes: "the extracting, processing, or refining of
metallic and nonmetallic minerals, including oil, gas, rock, marble, or slate; the construction
of roads, bridges, or housing; the processing of meat, fish, or other foodstuffs; the cultivation
of orchards, gardens, or nurseries; the operation of sawmills, the production of lumber, lumber
products, or other building materials; the fabrication or treatment of textiles, paper, leather
goods, or glass; and the rebuilding, as distinguished from the mere repairing, of machinery."
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(2) (1964).
138. 52 T.C. 68 (1969), aff'd 427 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
139. Id. at 73 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(2) (1964)).
140. 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 18, at 7.
141. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 516.
142. Id. at 517.
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many words in either the body of the Committee Reports or in sec-
tion 48 itself.1 3 The Technical Explanations use railroads and air-
lines as illustrations of the transportation business, and telephone,
telegraph, or radio or television broadcasting as examples of the
communications business.' 44 The regulations supply bus lines,
shipping and trucking companies, and oil pipeline companies as
further examples.' 45 As with manufacturing and production, the
Service is ordinarily cooperative on just what activities fall within
the ambit of transportation, etc., but it has refused to accede to
some of the more imaginative arguments advanced by taxpayers;
thus neither the Service 41 nor the Tax Court' 47 considers the opera-
tion of a ski lift as the furnishing of transportation.
The Service may be less cooperative on the issue of whether the
taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of furnishing electricity,
water, or similar services, preferring that such activities be the tax-
payer's primary trade or business in order to qualify. In Revenue
Ruling 67-433,11 the owner-lessor of a shopping center metered and
billed its tenants for their use of water and electricity. Nevertheless,
the Service concluded that because the taxpayer's primary trade or
business was the furnishing of space to its tenants, its activities as
a conduit for utility services must be merely incidental, despite the
existence of a profit on those services. Therefore, the taxpayer's
boilers, pumps, tanks, meters, and other water treatment and
electrical equipment could not qualify for the credit, since the
owner-lessor was not in the trade or business of furnishing electrical
energy or water services "as contemplated by the regulations.
1 41
Although this "primary trade or business" interpretation seems
restrictive, thus far it has survived judicial scrutiny. The Tax Court
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(1) (1964). The requirement did not appear in either section
48 itself or the body of the Committee Reports. As earlier noted, it is doubtless drawn from
the reference in § 46(c)(3)(B) concerning "public utility property," to "property used pre-
dominantly in the trade or business of furnishing" the utility activities. The regulations'
position is not unreasonable, since § 48(a)(1)(B)(i) does read: "manufacturing, production,
or extraction, or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water,
or sewage disposal services." [Emphasis supplied]. The use of the italicized "or of" seems
to indicate some distinction between the two groups of activities, lending plausibility to the
Service's position. This position has been sustained by the Tax Court in Mount Mansfield
Co., 50 T.C. 798 (1968) and Frank J. Evans, 48 T.C. 704 (1967), aff'd, 413 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir.
1969) (per curiam).
144. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 517.
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(3) (1964).
146. Rev. Rul. 69-13, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 25.
147. Mount Mansfield Co., 50 T.C. 798 (1968).
148. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 51.
149. Id. at 53. See also Rev. Rul. 69-273, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 30 (since a golf course is
not in the trade or business of furnishing water, underground components of sprinkler system
do not qualify for credit).
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held in Frank J. Evans"'0 that the furnishing of electricity, water,
gas, and sewage services by the operator of a trailer court to his
tenants did not constitute a distinct trade or business, indicating
that a showing of significant time spent repairing, maintaining, or
supervising the systems, as well as more careful records showing
some substantial amount of gross receipts, net profit, or even a good
faith anticipation of a profit might have buttressed the taxpayer's
case.151
Similarly, in Tejas Properties, Inc. v. United States15 2 a devel-
oper of residential properties was not allowed the credit for a water
storage tank and sewage disposal system installed to encourage the
sale of lots, for lack of the proper trade or business. The court specif-
ically adverted to the taxpayer's irregular billing procedures, his
failure to allocate costs to the services on his books, and the appar-
ent absence of intent to derive a profit from the services in question.
Hayden Island"' denied the credit for certain water and sewer lines
constructed by a developer who had "no thought" of making a profit
from these activities.
Some intent to show a profit, then, is crucial; and though nei-
ther Tejas Properties nor Hayden Island expressly imposed the "pri-
mary trade or business" requirement, their findings of lack of a
trade or business are not inconsistent with that requirement. Conse-
quently, to have any chance at all at the credit for equipment used
to furnish electricity, water or similar services, the taxpayer must
document his utility activities as a separate, profit-making opera-
tion; even then the credit may be disallowed if a court agrees with
the Service, as in Evans, that this activity must be the taxpayer's
primary trade or business.
(2) Research and Storage Facilities: A Special Situation
Even if other tangible property is not used as an "integral part"
of manufacturing, production, extraction, or of furnishing transpor-
tation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage dis-
posal services, it may still qualify for the credit if it serves as a
"research facility" or as a "facility for the bulk storage of fungible
commodities (including commodities in a liquid or gaseous state),"
150. 48 T.C. 704 (1967).
151. Id. at 708. Judge Tannenwald, concurring, felt such an inquiry unnecessary, un-
duly burdensome, and at variance with his interpretation of the statute, which would limit
the credit to suppliers (such as power stations) of these services, excluding conduits or con-
sumers, as he conceived the taxpayer in this case to be. Id. at 710.
152. 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9240 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
153. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9604 (D. Ore. 1974).
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"in connection with" any of those activities. 54 "In connection with"
connotes a lesser nexus with the qualifying activity than does "inte-
gral part." '155
Neither the Committee Reports nor the Technical Explana-
tions define or illustrate the term "research facilities." The regula-
tions also avoid defining the term, but they do cite wind tunnels and
test stands as examples.15 "Facilities for the bulk storage of fungible
commodities" are more clearly defined, and have become encrusted
with a sizeable body of rulings and judicial decisions. The original
enactment referred simply to "storage facilities. 1 57 The 1971
amendments, however, perhaps in an attempt to narrow the devel-
opment of the concept, 8 substituted the current wording with its
emphasis on "bulk" and "fungible", and the continued viability of
the considerable body of pre-1971 rulings and decisions is somewhat
unclear. 59
There is a surface contradiction between the statute's allow-
ance of the credit for storage facilities and its simultaneous disquali-
fication of buildings. Significantly, the Technical Explanations pro-
vide that "warehouses" are to be considered nonqualifying "build-
ings." 6 Some peculiar characteristics must distinguish storage fa-
cilities (as they were termed before 1971) from warehouses and other
buildings.
Because the statute singles out storage facilities for special
treatment by virtue of their use, the Service early decided that
function must be the key distinction. In Revenue Ruling 66-89,11 the
Service approved the credit for such items of farm property as corn
cribs, grain storage bins, and silos, but denied it for barns, stables,
poultry houses, and warehouses. In the Service's opinion, a two-
pronged function test had to be met: the facility must be presently
used for storage, and must not be reasonably adaptable for other
uses. Barns and the other examples of nonqualifying property failed
the second prong of the test because they provided working space,
154. INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 48(a)(1)(B)(ii), (iii).
155. The 1962 Technical Explanations state: "Research or storage facilities (other
than buildings) are eligible for the credit if used in connection with any of the specified
activities, although such property is not an integral part of the activity." 1962 TECH. EXPLANA-
TION, supra note 10, at 517.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(5)(i) (1964).
157. Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
158. See Kraus, New Developments in the Investment Tax Credit, 20 TUL. TAX INST.
237 (1971).
159. See Merchants Refrigerating Co., 60 T.C. 856, 859-60 (1973).
160. 1962 TEcH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 516. The difference is based on a
difference in the activity conducted. Rev. Rul. 74-451, 1974 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 38, at 7.
161. 1966-1 CuM. BuLL. 7.
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wherein the farmer was carrying on other activities besides simply
storage.
Certain limited activities "incidental to storage" do not result
in disqualification, however: for example, it was held permissible for
the owner of a potato storage facility to operate vents to dissipate
heat generated by the stored potatoes and to push the potatoes into
a central transportation canal for movement to another building.'
The Service specifically noted that the cleaning, processing, and
grading of the potatoes was conducted elsewhere, indicating that
these would be disqualifying activities if done within the storage
facility. 16 3
The Commissioner's view of the scope of permissible activities
within a storage facility was first challenged in Robert E. Catron,'"1
in a dispute over the proper classification of a quonset hut-like
structure. One third of this structure was used by its farmer-owner
for the cold-storage of boxed apples; this heavily insulated storage
area was set off from the rest of the structure by a floor-to-ceiling
partition pierced by a refrigerator door. The taxpayer conceded that
sorting and processing took place in the uninsulated area, but
argued that this did not in any way detract from the status of the
insulated area as a storage facility, in which the only work per-
formed was the insertion or removal of the stored commodity. The
Commissioner retorted that a building was a building, and that no
allocation was possible for parts of a building assertedly used for
storage: in his opinion the processing carried out in the uninsulated
two-thirds disqualified the entire structure. The Tax Court first
approved the concept of a functional inquiry for distinguishing the
special class of storage facilities from ordinary "buildings," and
observed that the nonrefrigerated two-thirds of the quonset hut
where the apples were sorted and otherwise processed was a non-
qualifying "building," not a storage facility, because it provided
working space. 6 5 The court rejected the Commissioner's "all-or-
nothing" argument, 6 however, observing that an allocation could
162. Rev. Rul. 68-132, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 10, 14, modified, Rev. Rul. 71-359, 1971-2
Cums. BULL. 61, 63 (excising references to the "predominant use" test).
163. Id. In addition to the emphasis on the activities conducted within the facility,
another common thread appearing in the pre-1971 rulings was that all the commodities stored
within approved facilities were fungible in nature. Thus, storage facilities approved included
those used for fungibles such as grain, Rev. Rul. 68-297, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 27; potatoes, Rev.
Rul. 68-132, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 10; or coal, Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 CuM. BuLu. 7. The Service
did not avail itself of any opportunities to expand the concept in published rulings to pack-
aged or otherwise sorted commodities.
164. 50 T.C. 306 (1968), acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 72-365, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 8.
165. This has often been cited as a key attribute of a "building." See text following note
243 infra.
166. The Commissioner had sought to justify this approach with the rather specious
1050 [Vol. 28
SECTION 38 PROPERTY MUDDLE
and should be made if part of a structure did indeed function as a
storage facility. 67 The court concluded that there was nothing to
indicate that the storage of boxed apples'65 was not within the con-
templation of the statute, and that the room qualified as a storage
facility because Revenue Ruling 66-89's'll two-pronged test had
been met: the room was used only as a storage facility (the bringing
in and removal of apples being only "incidental" activities), and
was not reasonably adaptable to other uses because "the chilly tem-
peratures which undoubtedly prevailed would surely limit its adapt-
ability."'70
Subsequent cases were substantially in accord with Catron's
interpretation of the function test. Barley receiving stations for a
brewery, in which barley might be stored for up to two years against
possible crop failure, were approved because storage was the "main
purpose" of the stations. 7' Moreover, certain incidental activities
could be carried on within a storage facility and would not automat-
ically disqualify it: thus, inhibition of the ripening of stored fruit in
''sweet rooms" by various controlled temperature and humidity
changes was permitted in Central Citrus Co.'72 over the Commis-
sioner's objection that this processing destroyed the character of the
areas as storage facilities. Similarly, the "not reasonably adapta-
ble" prong of the function test was generally construed, as in
Catron, to mean essentially "as currently operated not reasonably
adaptable to other uses."'' Thus, the barley-receiving stations men-
tioned above were held not reasonably adaptable to other uses sim-
ply because they had been designed for barley storage."7 In the same
vein, "the unusual dimensions and the varied extremes of tempera-
argument that taxpayers would throw the Treasury into chaos by claiming the credit for such
things as broom closets under the "storage facility" rubric. The Tax Court accorded this
argument the respect it deserved, noting that the Treasury had no difficulty allocating be-
tween buildings and fixtures or between business and personal use of property, and rejected
the argument as founded on nought but administrative convenience. 50 T.C. at 314.
167. The Tax Court observed: "Conceptually and in practice it is not impossible to
segregate aqualifying silo or grain-storage bin from a nonqualifying barn to which it may be
attached . . . ." Id.
168. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(5)(ii) (storage of boxed oranges does not qualify
after the 1971 statutory amendments because it is not bulk storage of a fungible commodity),
T.D. 7203, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 12.
169. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
170. 50 T.C. at 315.
171. Adolph Coors Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351, 1362 (1968).
172. 58 T.C. 365 (1972).
173. One must assume, after all, that the taxpayer there could have circumvented the
"chilling effect" of the temperature on other activities in that room by merely shutting off
the refrigeration equipment.
174. "The stations have no purpose except those stated herein and were designed and
constructed to best accomplish those purposes and no others." 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1362.
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ture, humidity, and air content undoubtedly limited the [sweet]
rooms' reasonable adaptability."'1 5
One problem with the Catron line of cases is that they do
not provide clear standards for the resolution of the "reasonable
adaptability" issue. A confused district court, after complaining of
Catron's imprecision, concluded in Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. United States7 ' that certain tobacco storage sheds were not
reasonably adaptable to other uses, although the Commissioner had
introduced evidence demonstrating that eleven similar sheds had
indeed been converted for other functions. 77
An unsuccessful stratagem employed by the Commissioner to
narrow the category of qualifying storage facilities was the "predom-
inant use" test, which attempted to pare back the breadth of the
"in connection with" requirement. Although the regulations con-
ceded that the taxpayer-owner of a storage facility need not be
engaged in the manufacturing process himself for the facility to
satisfy the "in connection with" requirement, 7 the Service took the
position in Revenue Rulings 67-220171 and 68-122111 that the predomi-
nant users of the facility must be directly engaged in the qualifying
activity if the owner himself was not. Thus, a grain elevator used
by its owner who bought, stored, and sold grain solely for his own
account and in which no space was leased directly to farmers could
not qualify.'' The Commissioner had abysmal luck with this test in
court. His first reverse came in Schuyler Grain Co.,"'2 involving
concrete grain storage bins owned and operated by a grain broker
who rented no space to farmers, but who did process some 8% of the
stored grain into animal feed and sold the balance. Although the
175. 58 T.C. at 371-72 (emphasis in original). Only occasionally was the Commissioner
able to have this test tightened up somewhat as in Palmer Olson, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1367
(1970), declaring that a quonset hut with moisture-proof floors, used for grain storage was
disqualified because it had been used earlier to store farm implements. In that case, the court
reversed the order of the elements of the test, observing that "[pirincipally, the facility may
not be reasonably adaptable to other uses, and secondly, it must provide only storage space
and not working space." Id. at 1369. The court concluded that the quonset huts could not
qualify, since they were "not unfit" for other use.
176. 369 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Ky. 1973), affd, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam).
177. The court based its decision on the $1.60 per square foot cost of conversion (the
buildings contained an average of 7700 square feet), and the nuisance involved in installing
toilets, heat, sprinkler facilities, and the like.
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(5) (1964).
179. 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 46, revoked, Rev. Rul. 71-359, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 61.
180. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 10, revoked, Rev. Rul. 71-359, 1971-2 Cum. BULL. 61.
181. See also Rev. Rul. 68-279, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 18 (pound operated by lobster broker
fails predominant use test; not revoked by 71-359); Rev. Rul. 68-282, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 25
(peanut storage facility fails predominant use test; revoked by 71-359).
182. 50 T.C. 265 (1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1969), acquiesced in, Rev. Rul.
71-359, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 61.
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case did not turn on this issue, both the Tax Court and the Seventh
Circuit evidenced considerable doubt about the validity of the pre-
dominant use test. '" After Schuyler Grain the predominant use test
suffered one judicial disaster after another,' 8 and it finally was
withdrawn in Revenue Ruling 71-359,185 revoking several prior rul-
ings.'86
The predominant use test had hardly been accorded its overdue
burial, however, when a new source of confusion was introduced into
the law of storage facilities: the 1971 Revenue Act 8 changed the
reference from "storage facilities" to a "facility used . . .for the
bulk storage of fungible commodities (including commodities in a
liquid or gaseous state).' ' 8 The Senate Finance Committee's Report
indicated that while certain incidental activities could still be un-
dertaken inside, "bulk storage" referred to the keeping of a com-
modity in a large mass prior to its consumption or utilization and
that "fungible commodities" were those which were of such a nature
that one part might be used in place of another. ' The regulations
were amended to reflect these changes; the regulations also contain
an observation that the act of sorting and boxing the stored com-
modity destroys the requisite characteristic of storage in "bulk."' 9
In the recent case of Merchants Refrigerating Co.,'" involving
pre-1971 construction, the court followed Catron in allowing the
credit for a free-standing cold storage room containing frozen foods
183. The Tax Court accused the Commissioner of trying "to impose a 'primary use' rule
to section 38 property where none is provided for either in the statute or in the regulations."
50 T.C. at 270. The court continued: "However, we need not consider the merits of such an
argument inasmuch as we conclude that the five bins in question were used 'in connection
with' at least some of the activities enumerated in section 48." Id. The Court of Appeals noted
that it could find no support for the predominant use test, were it applicable, in the regula-
tions. 411 F.2d at 652.
184. E.g., Sherley-Anderson-Rhea Elevator, Inc. v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1055
(N.D. Tex. 1970); F.P. Wood & Son, Inc. v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.N.C. 1970);
United States v. Loami Grain Co., 318 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
185. 1971-2 CUM. BuLL. 61 (revoking rulings 68-282, 68-122, and 67-220; modifying 68-
132).
186. Even though the "predominant use" test no longer terrorizes the "in connection
with" requirement, there must nevertheless be some nexus with a qualifying activity. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-152, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 14, at 8 (storage facility used by seller of retail
gasoline ineligible for the credit because of insufficient relation to qualifying activity).
187. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954).
188. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(1)(B)(iii).
189. S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [Hereinafter cited as 1971
REPORT].
190. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(5)(ii), T.D. 7203, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 12. provides in perti-
nent part: "Bulk storage means the storage of a commodity in a large mass prior to its
consumption or utilization. Thus, if a facility is used to store oranges that have been sorted
and boxed, it is not used for bulk storage."
191. 60 T.C. 856 (1973).
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packed in ready-to-market cartons. The court intimated, however,
that in its opinion Catron and Central Citrus probably had been
wrongly decided, 1 2 and noted with satisfaction that the statute they
had interpreted was no longer in force."3
Recent examples of facilities certified by the Service as engaged
in the bulk storage of fungible commodities include silos for un-
bagged cement,'94 underground tanks for gasoline,"' and a refriger-
ated structure containing mostly unsorted apples brought directly
in tote boxes from the orchard."' Despite the statement in the regu-
lation that storage of boxed and sorted fruit will disqualify a struc-
ture, the Service has indicated that it will relent if the amount of
such sorted articles comprises a relatively insignificant part of the
total of items stored."' A structure used to freeze and store drums
and cans of processed fruits, however, does not qualify.'" Similarly,
the Service feels that inventoried parts and individually identifiable
assembly elements of articles in manufacture such as radios are not
fungible, and cannot be considered stored in bulk."'
Notwithstanding the intimations in Merchants Refrigerating,2
it may well be that the Commissioner's interpretation of "fungible"
and "bulk" will be adjudged too narrow, should a taxpayer choose
to litigate the issue. It is equally as reasonable to maintain that the
intent of the 1971 amendment was merely to replace the extremely
vague term "storage facility" (which could have been interpreted,
192. Accordingly, if the matter were one of first impression, there would be much
force to the Government's position that Building F, plainly a type of warehouse, should,
unlike a silo or gasoline storage tank, be regarded as a "building" within the meaning
of the parenthetical language of clause (B) and that the freezer room within the structure
should therefore fail to qualify as "section 38 property." But the course of decision has
run in a different direction, and that result is precluded by at least two prior decisions
of this Court holding that a storage facility may qualify for the investment credit even
if it is a part of a larger structure having the physical attributes of a "building." (Citing
Catron and Central Citrus).
Id. at 859-60.
193. The Merchants court felt that there was serious doubt of the continued validity of
the propositions expressed in those cases that structures other than silos, storage tanks, and
the like could qualify, or that the storage of boxed commodities was permissible. Id. at 860.
194. Rev. Rul. 72-365, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 8.
195. Rev. Rul. 74-152, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 14, at 8 (the nexus to a qualifying
activity was missing, however, so the tanks were ineligible for the credit).
196. Rev. Rul. 74-451, 1974 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 38, at 7.
197. Id.
198. Rev. Rul. 74-452, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 38, at 8.
199. Rev. Rul. 74-3, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 11.
200. Merchants Refrigerating was written by Judge Raum, whose view of section 38
property does not seem to be expansive. See Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413, 419 (1974) (joining
Dawson, J., dissenting); Beverly R. Roberts, 60 T.C. 861 (1973); Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C.
113 (1972); Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972); Frank J. Evans, 48 T.C. 704, 710 (1967) (Tannen-
wald, J., concurring).
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for example, to comprehend facilities used to garage tractors) with
one that more clearly reflected the original intent of the 1962 enact-
ment. Such an argument imparts continued validity to Catron and
Central Citrus, and questions the correctness of the rulings which
hold that tubs of processed food are not fungible containers of com-
modities stored in bulk. Further, the Senate Finance Committee
indicated that fungible commodities are stored in bulk if kept in a
mass prior to consumption or utilization;"0 ' a case certainly can be
made for the proposition that food packed in numerous drums (each
of which is essentially fungible) is still kept "in a mass," and that
food which has been processed has nevertheless not yet been "con-
sumed" or "utilized." A judicial adoption of this reasoning certainly
would not mark the first instance of a court rejecting the Commis-
sioner's overly narrow interpretation of a definitional element of
section 38 property.
D. Conclusion: Other Tangible Property
Looking back from the Commissioner's restrictive interpreta-
tion of "bulk storage of fungible commodities" to the slippery con-
cept of "inherently permanent structure" one observes that the
landscape of "other tangible property" is cluttered with a confusing
mass of concepts. "Inherently permanent structure" is not defined
in the regulations, but the Commissioner apparently would like the
term to include nearly everything buried under or attached to the
land. He usually does not include items affixed to buildings, but one
may be nearly certain that an outdoor lighting facility will be con-
sidered an inherently permanent structure, wherever affixed. The
courts have quite properly refused in the main to accede to argu-
ments advanced by the Service for the automatic classification as
an inherently permanent structure of any structure attached in any
manner to the realty, usually preferring to conduct at least a limited
inquiry into the nature and permanence of attachment. Thus, the
Commissioner's attempt to supply a metaphysical permanence to
such impermanently rooted structures as floating docks by means
of an unconvincing functional analogy have been rejected through
a realization that intrinsic permanence and function are two dis-
tinct concepts, one of which cannot be supplied by the other. The
Commissioner's truculence in this area stands in sharp contrast to
his much more liberal approach to the meaning of "integral part,"
and "manufacturing, production or extraction." It is true that he
201. "Bulk storage has reference to the keeping of a commodity in a large mass prior
to its consumption or utilization. The commodity must be fungible in nature; that is, of such
a nature that one part may be used in place of another." 1971 REPORT, supra note 189 at 29.
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prefers to view "integral part" in terms of internal systemic integra-
tion, thus excluding components of a system added in response to
requirements imposed by such external sources as federal regulatory
agencies-a narrow but not unreasonable view. The Commissioner's
attitude on "manufacturing, production and extraction" has un-
doubtedly been influenced by the very unsympathetic judicial re-
sponses to his earlier, more restrictive interpretations. In a similar
development, he has recanted his attempt to constrict the breadth
of "in connection with" for storage and research facilities through
the spectacularly unsuccessful "predominant use" test.
This change in attitude may be due partly to his contention
that the 1971 amendments to the Code changing "storage facilities"
to "facilities for the bulk storage of fungible commodities" have
greatly restricted that field, making obsolete some of the earlier
decisions such as Catron and Central Citrus. Perhaps the Service
feels that this statutory victory makes its concession on the "pre-
dominant use" test insignificant. As indicated earlier, it is by no
means clear that the 1971 amendments did indeed attempt to con-
strict and reform the "storage facility" provision; that dispute must,
of course, ultimately be resolved by litigation. Regardless of the
resolution, it is clear that an analysis of function will remain the
keystone of the characterization process for storage facilities: only
the breadth of function embraced will be affected. Indeed, the func-
tional analysis flourishes in the area of storage facilities as it does
nowhere else in the law of the investment credit.
V. BUILDING AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS
A. Buildings
(1) Legislative History and Regulations
As proposed, section 38 property would have included buildings
along with other categories of "other tangible property," thus quali-
fying for the investment credit if the restrictions on use were com-
plied with. °2 The actual enactment, however, reversed this ap-
proach and specifically denied the credit for "buildings" and their
"structural components.1 20 3 Perhaps Congress felt that permitting
the credit for buildings would prove too inflationary, or would chan-
nel capital investment into areas not perceived as requiring the
tonic.24 Whatever the reason, the exclusion has resulted in a monu-
202. Richard, Is IRS Taking Too Narrow a View on What Qualifies as a "Structure"
for Section 38?, 30 J. TAX. 181 (1969).
203. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(1)(B).
204. The Committee Reports do not explain. 1962 REPORT, supra note 3, at 415-16.
1056 [Vol. 28
SECTION 38 PROPERTY MUDDLE
mental headache for the Service and taxpayers alike, precipitating
fierce semantic melees over just what is and what is not a "building"
or "structural component" thereof.0 5
The Technical Explanations of the 1962 Revenue Act observe
that:
The term "building" is to be given its commonly accepted meaning, that
is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered
by a roof. It is the basic structure of an improvement to land the purpose of
which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing or to provide working,
office, display, or sales space.2 "
The hope that "building" would be accorded its commonly accepted
meaning has proven to be overly optimistic.
In defining building, the regulations basically repeat the lan-
guage of the Technical Explanations, but rearrange the syntax with
the result that two distinct tests for "building" emerge. In stating
that "building" "generally means any structure or edifice enclosing
a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof ' 2 7 the Service
establishes an appearance test that closely approximates what is
referred to in the Technical Explanations as the "commonly ac-
cepted meaning" of "building." But in the next clause the regula-
tions add a functional test: "the purpose of which is, for example,
to provide shelter or housing, or to provide working, office, parking,
display or sales space. 208
The use of "generally" in the clause prescribing the appearance
test implies that there will be exceptions to that test; perhaps that
language was inserted to provide for such exceptions as "storage"
and "research facilities," which obviously look like buildings but
nevertheless are permitted to qualify for the credit because of their
peculiar function. Under this reading, both the appearance and
function tests would have to be met before a structure could be
termed a building, thus narrowing the category of buildings. Indeed,
this is the sense conveyed by the language of the Technical Explana-
tions, which seem to attribute both the appearance and functional
characteristics to the concept of "building. ' 20 9 There is another pos-
205. For example, the Rhode Island Tnvestment Credit has chosen not to enter the
"what is a building" thicket, providing that property eligible for the credit includes: "tangible
personal property and other tangible property, including buildings and structural compo-
nents of buildings ... ." R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-31-1(a) (Supp. 1974).
206. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 516.
207. Emphasis supplied. The full sentence reads: "The term 'building' generally means
any structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof, the
purpose of which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing, or to provide working, office,
parking, display, or sales space." Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1964).
208. Id.
209. See note 206 supra and accompanying text.
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sible reading, however, which broadens "building"-interpreted
differently, a structure meeting either test constitutes a "building."
Thus, under the appearance test, all structures which look like
buildings are "buildings" for purposes of section 38; in addition,
structures which do not look like buildings, but which nevertheless
act like them under the function test, are also "buildings" for which
the credit is not available. Because it provides much room for ma-
neuver, this latter reading is preferred by the Service.
The regulations also provide two "special purpose" exceptions
to the term "building":
a structure which is essentially an item of machinery or equipment, [and] a
structure which houses property used as an integral part of an activity [which
is a qualifying activity for 'other tangible property'] if the use of the structure
is so closely related to the use of such property that the structure clearly can
be expected to be replaced when the property it initially houses is replaced .2 1
The relationship of these exceptions to the appearance and function
tests is not quite clear; for example, is a structure which is essen-
tially an item of machinery or equipment not a "building" even
though it provides working space, or would the existence of working
space prevent it from qualifying as "essentially an item of machi-
nery' "?211 Equally unclear are the consequences of falling within one
of the two exceptions: is a structure that is saved from being a
building because essentially an item of machinery or equipment to
be considered "tangible personal property,1 1 2 or "other tangible
property" subject to the integral part restriction on use?213 Further,
whatever the answer to that question might be, is the answer the
same for an item spared the "building" fate by the other exception,
for structures "closely related" to machinery?2 1 1
(2) The Appearance Test for "Building"
The regulations cite apartment houses, factory and office build-
ings, warehouses, 25 barns, garages, railway and bus stations, and
210. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1964).
211. Little clarification was furnished by the legislative history of the 1971 Revenue Act.
See 1971 REPoRT, supra note 189, at 29-30.
212. By virtue of the statement in Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) that all items in the nature
of machinery are considered tangible personal property.
213. Because an inherently permanent structure. See discussion following note 60
supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 302 et seq. infra.
215. "Storage facilities are distinguished from warehouses in that the former are gener-
ally structures of any size, shape, or construction designed for bulk storage of fungible com-
modities (including commodities in liquid or gaseous state). In contrast, warehouses generally
are conventional buildings designed for general storage purposes." Rev. Rul. 74-451, 1974 INT.
REv. BULL. No. 38, at 7. To say that warehouses are "conventional buildings" comes very close
to begging the question.
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stores as examples of "buildings,""2 ' all of which concededly look
like buildings and comport with the common understanding of the
term. In an early ruling, the Service applied the appearance test to
conclude that a booth for drive-up banking was a "building," ob-
serving that the booth enclosed space within its walls and was cov-
ered by a roof."1 7 On similar reasoning, a "mushroom house" spe-
cially designed for and suitable only as a place in which to grow
mushrooms was denoted a "building" because of its walls and
roof,"8 as were towers housing machinery at a breaker and fine-coal
plant,' and docking and maintenance facilities at a trucking ter-
minal. 2 1 An electrical utility's strong "special purpose structure,
closely combined with equipment" argument was rejected through
application of the appearance test in Revenue Ruling 73-281,221 de-
nying the credit for enclosures that the taxpayer was required by
local zoning ordinances to erect around its transmission substations.
Although these enclosures were specially adapted for housing equip-
ment, with reinforced floors and oversize doors for access to the
equipment, and though no substantial work activities were carried
out therein, the Service's attention was riveted on their exterior
resemblance to other, more pedestrian, "buildings" in the area,
resulting in disallowance of the credit.
The Service is not above employing something of a "heads-I-
win, tails-you-lose" approach in this area, however. Thus, when
confronted with structures which apparently do not qualify as build-
ings under the appearance test, the Service asserts the functional
test to support the "building" appellation. Thus, the Service has
termed "buildings" a structure supporting an overhead crane222 and
a baseball stadium22 even though the former had neither floor nor
sides, and the latter no roof. In perhaps the most interesting depar-
ture from the appearance test, Revenue Ruling 68-530224 reached the
novel conclusion that a "building" could exist, like Jonah, within
the belly of another "building": considering "clean rooms" built
within a factory for the dust-free testing of electronic equipment,
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1964).
217. Rev. Rul. 65-79, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 26. Note also that the purpose of this booth
was to provide working space, a most important indicium of a "building" under the functional
analysis. See note 246 infra and accompanying text.
218. Rev. Rul. 66-156, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 11.
219. Rev. Rul. 68-50, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 364.
220. Rev. Rul. 71-203, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 7.
221. 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 7. This argument was also made without success in the case of
a building converted to a cold-storage warehouse through the addition of refrigeration equip-
ment and superheavy insulation. Rev. Rul. 68-405, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 35.
222. Rev. Rul. 68-209, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 16.
223. Rev. Rul. 69-170, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 28.
224. 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 37.
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the Service maintained that "[tihe fact that the 'clean rooms' are
contained within a larger building and were constructed so as to
provide a controlled temperature, humidity, and dust-free environ-
ment does not keep them from coming within the definition of the
term 'buildings' ... ,,22
Early court decisions in the area accorded great weight to the
appearance test, although the cases generally dealt with structures
which qualified as "buildings" under both the appearance and the
function tests. Thus, in Sunnyside Nurseries, Inc. 28 and Arne
Thirup2 11 the Tax Court noted that the taxpayers' greenhouses, in
terms of their physical appearance and function, were clearly build-
ings within the common understanding of that term. Other deci-
sions, however, have de-emphasized the appearance test in situa-
tions where that test pointed to "building," but the function test did
not. In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States228 the Court
of Claims allowed the credit for six whiskey maturation facilities
because of their special function despite their physical resemblance
to "buildings," noting sarcastically that:
[The Commissioner's position is] premised essentially on what might be
called a "look-alike" argument, i.e., since the facilities look like buildings, they
must be ipso facto buildings as that term is used in section 48(a)(1)(B).
Strangely enough, this position is in direct contradiction to a consistent pat-
tern developed by [the Commissioner's] own ruling.2
And in Melvin Satrumo the Tax Court noted that "it is clear that
the courts have concluded that certain structures, though outwardly
resembling buildings, were not considered so for purposes of section
48(a)(1)(B)."' 1 That decision permitted the credit on a functional
analysis for an automated poultry raising facility,32 despite one
judge's complaint that his rural heritage had always taught him
that a henhouse was "really and truly a 'building'," infected with
"the unmistakable look of a building. ' 233 It is perhaps too early to
speculate on the future of the appearance test. If nothing else, it
serves as a valuable link between the rarified and often hyper-
technical world of tax definitions and the more prosaic world of
common sense and common understanding. But Brown-Forman
and Satrum seem to be the beginnings of a trend away from this
225. Id. at 38.
226. 59 T.C. 113 (1972).
227. 59 T.C. 122 (1972) (decided the same day as Sunnyside).
228. 74-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9592 (Ct. C1. 1974).
229. Id. at 84,911.
230. 62 T.C. 413 (1974).
231. Id. at 416.
232. See text accompanying notes 257 & 300 infra.
233. 62 T.C. at 420 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
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emphasis on appearance. The law may be moving toward the point
where both the appearance and the function tests must be satisfied
before the Commissioner will be permitted to refuse the credit on
the ground that a structure under consideration is a "building," or
future development may indicate that the appearance test will be
totally overshadowed and replaced by the functional test.
(3) The Function Test for "Building"
An inquiry into the function of a structure is quite a realistic
approach to its categorization for purposes of the investment
credit.234 Indeed, at times the Service has noted that "the definition
of the term building for investment credit purposes is stated in
terms of function rather than physical appearance."2 5 While this
probably overstates the Service's general position,23 an analysis of
function is certainly a major element of the decision whether a
structure will be disallowed the credit because it is a building. The
regulations observe that structures which provide shelter or housing,
or working, office, parking, display, or sales space are performing
the archetypal functions of a "building. '23 7
The Revenue Rulings have classified numerous structures as
buildings because their purpose and function was to provide shelter.
An early ruling disallowed the credit for a steel structure providing
an automated system for the care, feeding, and raising of hogs
through their maturity because it served as a "shelter" for the
hogs. 8 Airplane hangars similarly have been denied the credit as
buildings by virtue of the parking space and shelter they provide for
aircraft and mechanics. 239 A somewhat less convincing ruling dis-
qualified a covered grandstand because it provided shelter for pa-
trons of a racetrack.2 0 Although all of the aforementioned examples
provided at least some shelter for living creatures, a structure may
be disqualified if it provides shelter for machinery alone, even with-
234. Especially in the case of a "storage facility," where an examination of function
may be the'only means of telling such a facility from a "warehouse." See Robert E. Catron,
50 T.C. 306 (1968); Rev. Rul. 74-451, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 38, at 7.
235. Rev. Rul. 68-209, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 16,17.
236. This ruling dealt with a "storage facility"; the analysis is not necessarily the same
for all buildings. See note 234 supra and CONCLUSION infra.
237. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1964).
238. Rev. Rul. 66-329, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 16. This ruling was disapproved in the Senate
Finance Committee Report on the 1971 Revenue Act. 1971 REPORT, supra note 189, at 29-30.
239. Rev. Rul. 66-329, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
240. Rev. Rul. 69-614, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 8. The result is probably correct, but the
emphasis on providing spectator shelter is unfortunate and possibly misleading. A grandstand
of sturdy construction would likely be considered a building with or without a shelter-
providing roof. See notes 259-60 and accompanying text infra.
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out space for humans to move around in inside.241 This does not
necessarily mean that any roofed structure is subject to the charge
that it does, or could, provide shelter for someone or something, and
is, therefore, a "building": Revenue Ruling 68-345 42 stopped short
of using this rationale with metal canopies erected over the pump
islands of service stations, probably because such canopies are
clearly beyond the pale of the "common-understanding" of the term
"building." Nevertheless, one suspects that the Service would have
been tempted to characterize the canopies as buildings had they
been employed in an activity which, unlike retail gasoline selling,
would have otherwise qualified them for the credit if "other tangible
property.2) 43
Perhaps the most commonly invoked functional rubric is the
characterization of a structure as a "building" because it provides
"working space." The existence of working space, apparently with-
out distinguishing between actual work space and space where work
merely could be conducted,' 44 serves, for example, to distinguish
between qualifying "storage facilities" and ineligible "ware-
houses. 2 45 "Work" generally refers to any sort of human employ-
ment or endeavor, although an inquiry into the quantum of the
activity conducted is appropriate. A structure whose principal pur-
pose is to provide space for work will not be eligible for the credit;
an obvious example is a factory building.2 46 A less obvious example
is the "clean room," which although it appeared to be a large piece
of equipment, was nevertheless disqualified.2 4
Even if the principal purpose of the structure is to provide space
for something other than human work, the Service will disallow the
credit for any areas of the structure where a substantial amount of
work is performed that can be conceptually separated from the rest;
an example is Revenue Ruling 69-412,'24 in which the Service ap-
proved "the credit for a structure enclosing an electrical generating
station (as closely combined with machinery), but denied it for one
241. Rev. Rul. 72-398, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 9 (blockhouse for antenna relay and switching
equipment, with hardly room to move around inside, is a "building").
242. 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 30.
243. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-209, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 16 (craneway is a building, and is ineligible
for the credit even though engaged in an otherwise qualifying activity).
244. Compare Palmer Olson, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 1367 (1970) (work could be per-
formed within structure, so it is a "building") with Rev. Rul. 66-89, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 7 (work
is being performed inside structure in question, making it a "building").
245. See generally Rev. Rul. 74-451, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 38, at 7.
246. Rev. Rul. 66-299, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 14. There was, however, a legitimate issue as
to whether the factory nevertheless should be credited because "closely combined" with
machinery housed therein. See text following note 286 infra.
247. Rev. Rul. 68-530, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 37.
248. 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
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area devoted to office space.
Sometimes it appears that the Service unduly exaggerates the
importance of working space provided by a structure which ob-
viously has some other, more important, function. A striking exam-
ple is the craneway discussed in Revenue Ruling 68-209.49 This
craneway, providing a track for a movable overhead crane, had a
roof and mounted light fixtures, but had no sides and only a dirt
floor. The Service nevertheless concluded that the craneway was a
"building" because it provided shelter and working space under the
roof (which was apparently added chiefly to absorb stress placed on
the structure by the cranes) for employees to carry on tasks related
to the assembly of the taxpayer's product. Indeed, the Service is
more interested in the quantum of work carried on in the structure
than in the relation of that work to the principal purpose of the
structure. Just as the craneway was labeled a building because the
Service felt that a substantial amount of activity, although unre-
lated to the purpose of the structure, took place therein, a structure
housing the generator and propulsion turbines at a hydroelectric site
escaped characterization as a "building" despite the fact that main-
tenance and repair work was intended to be performed inside be-
cause that work was found insubstantial, and therefore "inciden-
tal. '20 Naturally, a taxpayer is on much safer ground if no work
whatever is carried on within the structure.2'1
The courts have largely agreed with the Commissioner's analy-
sis, frequently pointing to the existence or lack of working space as
key elements in the decision that a structure is or is not a building.
The Tax Court in Sunnyside Nurseries22 and Arne Thirup 5 3 re-
jected some plausible arguments advanced by the taxpayers for the
proposition that their automated greenhouses should be considered
items of equipment; the basis for the rejection was the large amount
of human activity which took place within the structures. The court
noted in Sunnyside that "a corps" of the taxpayer's employees,
often fifty at a time, carried out all sorts of activities inside the
greenhouses, and that this characteristic of "frequent and regular
human occupation" (even though "supplemental" to the main pur-
pose of providing a controlled environment) served to defeat the
owner's contention that the greenhouses were merely large pro-
cessing chambers.2 54 In Thirup, decided on the same day as
249. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 16.
250. Rev. Rul. 72-223, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 17.
251. Rev. Rul. 71-104, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 5.
252. 59 T.C. 113 (1972).
253. 59 T.C. 122 (1972).
254. 59 T.C. 113, 119-20.
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Sunnyside, the court conceded that the greenhouses were less sub-
stantial and "building-like" than those in its companion case, but
concluded nevertheless that they properly were classified as "build-
ings" because of the substantial number of persons who were occu-
pied therein for no less than five full work days per week.255 It will
also be recalled that in Catron"8 the court distinguished the area of
the quonset hut which could qualify as a storage facility from the
remainder of the structure by the extent of the work done in each
part, and permitted a small amount of "incidental" work (the
movement of goods to and from storage) to be carried on within the
storage area.
To the same effect is the recent decision in Melvin Satrum .157
Satrum's automated poultry facilities contained space between the
chicken cages where humans could walk, and various individuals
did perform some tasks inside, such as collecting eggs, feeding the
birds, and removing droppings; the total time spent was perhaps six
man-hours per day. The Tax Court majority adverted to the diffi-
culty of locating the point on the spectrum between providing no
working space and providing such a quantum of space for workers
that a structure becomes a "building," but concluded that the work
done by humans in these henhouses was insufficient to be more than
incidental to the main "production work performed therein by the
chickens which was, to state it in the vernacular, what the facility
was all about. 258
While providing space for shelter or work is the most frequently
encountered use of structures that invokes the "building" classifica-
tion under the function test, it is certainly not the only one. One of
the factors pointed to by the Service in denoting a baseball stadium
a "building" was its function of furnishing spectator space. 59 This
is a more satisfactory and consistent rationale for the classification
of sports facilities, most of which are within the common under-
standing of "building" anyway, than is an emphasis on affording
255. 59 T.C. 122, 127-28.
256. Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968), acquiesced in, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 44,
at 5. See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra.
257. CCH TAx CT. REP. 32,665 (1974).
258. Id. at 2756. Note that the Tax Court considered both the amount of work in
absolute terms and its nexus to the main purpose of the facility. See notes 249-50 and
accompanying text supra. The dissenting judges strenuously objected that the degree of
human activity carried on in Satrum was indistinguishable from that which had resulted in
the classification of the greenhouses in Sunnyside and Thirup as buildings, emphasizing that
the work done in the henhouses was conducted on a daily basis, was indispensible to the
operation, and was "substantial." CCH TAx CT. REP. 32,665 at 2757 (1974) (Dawson, J.,
joined by Raum & Drennen, JJ., dissenting). In any event, the dissent asserted that there
was at least as much work done in Satrum's poultry houses as there was in "any barn, which
is plainly a building within the meaning of the statute."
259. Rev. Rul. 69-170, 1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 28.
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shelter for spectators. 2 1
A creative argument sometimes advanced by the Service in an
attempt to expand the function analysis is to maintain that a struc-
ture is a building because it "provides space for the ordinary func-
tions of buildings." The Service originally may have intended this
formulation as a short-hand expression for some of the other, al-
ready detailed, functions, but it is an unfortunate phrasing: it is
vague; it is circular in the implied conclusion that a building is a
building because it is a building; and it may serve as a smokescreen
concealing either a lack of analysis, an expansion of the "building"
concept, or both. This formulation was harmlessly employed in Rev-
enue Ruling 73-281,1 dealing with enclosures built by an electric
utility under local zoning ordinances to camouflage its transformers
and relay substations by making them resemble other buildings in
the neighborhood. The structures looked like buildings, but the
Service was not content to rest its decision that they were "build-
ings" on the appearance test; although it could point to no human
activity inside, the Service bravely concluded that "the enclosures
are structures, enclosing space within their walls, that provide the
ordinary functions of a building. ' 22 The reasoning is insubstantial,
and the ruling illustrates the virtues of leaving well enough alone.
Probably the most objectionable applications of the function
test by the Service have come in cases involving mobile homes and
other trailers. Revenue Ruling 67-156263 concluded that a motor ve-
hicle trailer used as a laundrette at a mobile home park was a
"building" by employing the same sort of reasoning that failed the
Commissioner concerning the floating docks in Morgan:211 if an im-
permanent asset is employed in the same manner as another more
permanent one, then the classification applied to the more perma-
nent asset for investment credit purposes should be applied by anal-
ogy to the less permanent one. Here, the Service concluded that
since most laundrettes were contained in "building," trailers used
as laundrettes should be considered "buildings," too, despite the
unbuilding-like characteristic of mobility.2 5 After this Nijinskian
260. This seems a more satisfactory rationale than that employed in Rev. Rul. 69-614,
supra note 240. The discussion is important only as a matter of logical consistency, however,
since these facilities would not likely qualify for the credit even if they escaped the "building"
characterization, because the presentation of sporting events is not a qualifying activity for
"other tangible property," and only a strained construction of "tangible personal property"
could embrace these structures.
261. 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 8.
262. Id. For a fuller statement of the facts of this ruling, see text following note 221
supra.
263. 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 7.
264. See text following note 114 supra.
265. The Service lamely attempted to explain away the problem of mobility by stating
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leap, it would be but a short step to conclude that a circus tent is
also a "building."
The Commissioner employed the analogy of function rationale
to assert before an unimpressed TaxCourt that a house trailer was
a building in Joseph H. Moore. 6 The Tax Court observed:
The regulations cite "buildings or other inherently permanent structures"
as examples of improvements to land, indicating that in order to fit the defini-
tion of a building, an item of property must be an inherently permanent
structure on the land. [citation omitted]. It is apparent that the trailers in
the instant case do not fit this description.2 7
The court required that "before the 'functional use' test can pro-
perly be applied . . . it must first be shown that the trailers were
permanent improvements to land, ' 28s and the court concluded they
were not." ' This holding that simply to perform the function of a
more permanent building does not a building make is a most reason-
able rejection of a hypertechnical and fictional approach to an area
already exhibiting a marked divergence from real-world considera-
tions.
Indeed, the most serious difficulty with the functional analysis
is that the test, which began as an attempt to inject a realistic
consideration into the characterization process, shows signs of ulti-
mately developing into the vehicle which will eliminate reality as
an element of the decision. To the extent that analysis of and analo-
gies concerning a structure's use come to overshadow and replace
examination of its appearance, there is a danger of excessive resort
to fictions through the conversion of ordinary words into legal cant.
A building in law may come to bear less and less resemblance to its
counterpart in fact. There are already ample indications of such a
drift. One example is the strained analogy employed in the attempt
to characterize trailers as "buildings," which glosses over the prob-
lem that the trailer's mobility is totally inconsistent with the com-
mon understanding of a building. Another difficulty becomes appar-
that: "[a]n asset which has mobility characteristics is not automatically excluded from the
category of buildings .... Its actual functional use rather than its possible use will be
controlling." 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 7,8 [emphasis added]. Farmer Olson doubtless would have
made good use of this language had he been aware of it (illustrating the folly of pro se tax
litigation) in the case of his quonset huts, which were banished from the garden of "storage
facilities" not because an objectionable use was being made of them, but because it could
have been. Palmer Olson, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1367 (1970).
266. 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff'd, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. % 9146 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
267. 58 T.C. 1045, 1051-52 (the emphasis is the court's).
268. Id. at 1053.
269. By having the trailers classified as tangible personal property, the taxpayer won
the battle. The Service won the war, however: it was determined that the trailers were
ineligible for the credit because within § 48(a)(3)'s exclusion of property used predominantly
for furnishing lodging. Id.
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ent by juxtaposing Revenue Ruling 68-2092° and Satrum271 : a lay-
man would surely marvel at the sophisticated legal metaphysics
producing the conundrum that a craneway lacking floor or sides is
a "building," whereas a henhouse possessing both is not.
Symptomatic of the attitude underlying this overzealous appli-
cation of a functional analysis is the curt rejection in Brown-Forman
of the Commissioner's attempt to interest the Court of Claims in the
dictionary definition of "building." Reciting Judge Learned Hand's
familiar admonition about fortresses and dictionaries, the court ob-
served that:
those definitions are of little help in the task of construing the statutory word
* * *,The architect tends to define "building" in terms of a common-features
rationale rather than on a consideration of the structure's function or use...
[which] is the more important criterion. 2
To first analyze function rather than physical features, as the court
says, may be the desirable methodology; but to reject all considera-
tion of physical features or common understanding, as the court
does, is shortsighted oversimplification. The Technical Explana-
tions to the 1962 Revenue Act established the "common under-
standing" of the term "building" as the guideline for the resolution
of difficult issues; one wonders what quicker way exists to discover
the common understanding of a term than to consult the dictionary.
One is led inescapably to the conclusion that in Brown-Forman the
Commissioner was right, and the court wrong, on the issue of the
relevance of the dictionary.
(4) The "Special Purpose" Exceptions
In addition to the appearance and function tests for the isola-
tion and identification of characteristics indicating that a structure
is a building, the regulations also provide some special categories of
structures that will not be considered buildings for investment
credit purposes. Besides storage and research facilities, the regula-
tions state that the term "building" does not include a structure
which is essentially an item of machinery or equipment, nor does it
include a structure housing property used as an integral part of
manufacturing, production, extraction, or of furnishing transporta-
tion, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage dis-
posal services if the use of the structure is so closely related to the
use of the property contained therein that the structure "clearly can
270. 1968-1 Cum. BuLL. 16 (the craneway). See text accompanying notes 222 & 249
supra.
271. See notes 257-58 supra and accompanying text.
272. 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9592 at 84,913.
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be expected to be replaced" when the property it initially houses is
replaced. 7
It was not at all clear in the beginning precisely what sort of
machinery the Service had in mind in conceiving this exception for
equipment which was essentially an item of machinery or equip-
ment and which might be mistaken for a building. Presumably, the
structures spoken of should share certain characteristics of other
buildings, such as enclosing some sort of space. The "clean rooms"
of Revenue Ruling 68-53027 might have seemed likely candidates for
this exception, since they combined qualities smacking of a building
(walls, floors, and ceilings) with others consistent with the notion
of specialized "equipment" (special construction thoughout and a
separate atmospheric control system to ensure a dust-free interior
environment), if not "machinery." The Service was unimpressed
with this contention, however, and did not even discuss the "machi-
nery or equipment" exception, concluding that the existence of
working space within made the clean rooms little "buildings." Nor
was the "equipment" issue discussed in Revenue Ruling 68-405, 21
which held that a building converted into a cold storage warehouse
by a meat processor who installed refrigeration equipment and
heavy insulation, sealing all the doors and windows, nevertheless
remained a "building." The taxpayer might have argued that the
building was a giant refrigerator, and hence an item of "equip-
ment": if the argument was made, the Service did not dignify it
with a reply in the published ruling.
After this inauspicious beginning, however, the Service began
to put flesh on the bones of the "machinery or equipment" excep-
tion. In Revenue Ruling 69-55727s a dry kiln structure used by a
wooden door and column manufacturer became the first piece of
property officially to qualify for the exception. Although the sides,
floors, and roofs certainly made the kilns look like buildings, the
Service observed that they could provide neither shelter nor working
space because of the high temperatures inside; rather, they were
273. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1975). This language is taken from the Senate Finance
Committee Report on the 1971 Revenue Act. 1971 REPORT, supra note 189, at 29-30. Before
1972, this latter exception read "must be replaced." The regulation cites oil and gas storage
tanks, grain storage bins, silos (which in any event qualify as facilities for the bulk storage of
fungible commodities), fractionating towers, blast furnaces, basic oxygen furnaces, coke
ovens, brick kilns, and coal tipples as examples of structures which thus escape from the
building rubric, but do not clearly indicate whether each particular example is exempted
because "essentially an item of machinery or equipment," or "so closely related" to property
used as an integral part of one of the aforementioned activities.
274. 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 37. See also text accompanying note 247 supra.
275. 1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 35.
276. 1969-2 CuM. BuLL. 3.
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chambers for automatic processing of a product. Concluding that
the kilns were essentially indistinguishable except for size from the
shells or chambers of ovens, the Service ruled that they were not
"buildings" because they were esentially items of machinery or
equipment. Somewhat later the Service employed similar reasoning
to hold in Revenue Ruling 71-489217 that refrigerator and freezer
structures used in the final processing of dairy products were also
essentially items of machinery or equipment rather than "build-
ings."278
Reading these rulings together, one concludes that the "item of
machinery or equipment" exception seems to be reserved by the
Service for specially constructed processing chambers, although
these chambers will qualify for the exception only if the processing
is essentially automatic. Any substantial amount of human activity
conducted within the chamber will result in its exclusion from the
exception and classification as a "building."
Little judicial activity has taken place in the area, although the
Court of Claims reached a decision along the above lines in Brown-
Forman Distillers,211 holding that the whiskey maturation sheds
were essentially items of equipment. The court refused to call them
"buildings" because of their functions as mild ovens, cycling the
temperature and humidity to control the aging of whiskey in wooden
barrels. Significantly, no human work went on inside. Although
these maturation sheds do not seem as "mechanical" or machine-
like as the dry kilns or freezers, the analogy to those latter items
drawn by the court is not unpersuasive.20
The second special purpose category of structures which will
not be considered buildings is structures so closely related to the use
of the property housed inside certain property2si that they "clearly
can be expected" to be replaced contemporaneously with that prop-
erty.2 2 The regulations note that factors indicating that a structure
277. 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 64.
278. Because of the low temperatures inside these structures, the only work carried out
within them was the stacking or removal of the commodities brought there to be chilled or
frozen.
279. See note 238 supra.
280. The unpersuasive part of the opinion is the short shrift the court accords appear-
ances. See text accompanying note 272 supra.
281. The property must be used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or
extraction, or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or
sewage disposal services. It is not clear in the regulations whether the property itself must be
machinery or even "tangible personal property." Treas. Reg. §1.48-1(e)(1) (1975).
282. The regulation reads: "[A] structure which houses property used as an integral
part of an activity specified in section 48(a)(1)(B)(i) if the use of the structure is so closely
related to the use of such property that the structure clearly can be expected to be replaced
when the property it houses eventually is replaced." Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1975).
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is "closely related to the property it houses" include the fact that
the structure is specially designed to provide for the stress or other
demands of that property, as well as the fact that the structure
could not be used economically for other purposes. The present
regulations, amended in 1972,283 relax the stand taken in the original
regulation, which had required that the structure contain "machi-
nery or equipment" (now the term used is the broader "property"),
had specified that the structure "must be replaced" (rather than
"can be expected to be replaced"), and had required further that
the structure be depreciated over the life of the machinery con-
tained therein.284
The Service has never generously applied this exception to
structures. For example, an attempt to qualify under it was rejected
in Revenue Ruling 66-156,25 involving the "mushroom house." Al-
though the structure would have been quite unsuitable without sub-
stantial reconstruction for any purpose other than to provide that
dark, dank atmosphere so favored by adolescent mushrooms, the
Service read quite literally the requirement then in effect that the
structure be closely combined with "machinery" and the result was
the conclusion that the house was a "building. ' 288 Similarly, a fac-
tory building carefully constructed around the manufacturing pro-
cess it housed, with specially designed and placed walls and ceil-
ings, was nevertheless held outside the "closely combined with the
machinery" exception. Conceding that the factory had been spe-
cially designed to provide for the stress demands of the machinery
and equipment installed therein, the Service emphasized that the
machinery could be removed and replaced without requiring the
total demolition of the building-although an exterior wall or two
might need to be torn down to get the machinery out.27 The Service
probably believed that to allow the credit for factory buildings
would have created too large a loophole in the general prohibition
against allowing the credit for "buildings."
The exception was construed just as narrowly in Revenue Rul-
283. The amendment was announced in T.D. 7203, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 5.
284. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1975), promulgated by T.D. 6731, 1964-1 (part 1) CuM.
BULL. 11, 37, as amended, T.D. 7203, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 5.
285. 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 11. See text accompanying note 218 supra.
286. Perhaps there would be a different result if the ruling were requested today, since
the reference in the regulations to "machinery" has been changed to "property used as an
integral part of an activity specified in section 48(a)(1)(B)(i)," which the mushroom beds
plainly seem to be. See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d)(4) (1975).
287. Rev. Rul. 66-299, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 14. This ruling has been criticized by the most
prolific commentator in the section 38 property field. Kraus, Problems in Identifying Section
38 Property, 127 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 51, 53 (1969).
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ings 68-5011 and 68-20911 involving breaker equipment towers at a
fine-coal plant and the infamous overhead craneway, respectively.
Although the structures in both instances had been specially de-
signed and constructed to support and absorb the stress of the
machinery in question, the Service disallowed the credit because the
equipment could be replaced without destroying the structures;
thus, went the reasoning, they must be "buildings. 129 1
By contrast, the Commissioner did approve the credit in Reve-
nue Ruling 66-125291 for the enclosures built around compressors at
a natural gas installation. Replacement of the compressors would
have required removal of the enclosure. Since the "total disman-
tling" test, as it might be termed, was satisfied, the enclosures were
not deemed "buildings. ' 29 2 A more recent ruling293 shows that con-
siderations other than the extent of dismantling required are also
relevant. The structure there in question housed the generator and
propulsion turbine of a hydroelectric facility. In approving the
credit the Service cited the difficulty of removal of the generator and
turbines, but also remarked on the functional integration between
the structure, turbines, and generator, as well as their interrela-
tionship in terms of useful life, structure, and design. This shift in
emphasis to an appreciation of the continuing utility (or futility) of
the structure if separated from its equipment is an advance from the
"total destruction" test.294
Taxpayers complaining that the Commissioner is being too
tight-fisted with this exception have received mixed reactions in the
288. 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 364.
289. 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 16.
290. Similar reasoning was employed in Rev. Rul. 72-398, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 9, to deny
the credit for blockhouses enclosing antenna relay equipment.
291. 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 17.
292. The credit was also allowed for the metallic skin covering constructed around a
massive assembly at an electrical power plant in Revenue Ruling 69-412, 1969-2 CuM. BULL.
2. The skin and the structural elements supporting it were considered an integral part of the
boiler assembly on much the same reasoning as in the case of the enclosures around the
compressors at the natural gas plant: complete dismantling of the coverings would have been
required for replacement of the sheltered machinery.
293. Rev. Rul. 72-223, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 17.
294. Although the Service revised the wording of the regulations dealing with the
"closely related" exception to "buildings" in 1972, it does not seem to have revised its
thinking on the matter to any great degree. For example, in a ruling issued after the change
in the regulations, Rev. Rul. 73-281, 1973-2 CUM. BULL. 8, the Service placed the "building"
label on enclosures for electrical transmission substations. For a fuller explication of the facts,
see the text accompanying note 221 supra. In so doing it relied on another ruling issued before
the change, Rev. Rul. 72-398, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 9, which had grounded its decision on the
failure of the taxpayer to convince the Service that the structure "must" be replaced (in the
words of the old regulation) concurrently with the machinery housed therein. The Service
apparently sees little difference between "must be replaced" and "clearly can be expected to
be replaced."
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courts. In Walton Mill, Inc. 195 the Tax Court rebuffed the taxpayer's
attempt to characterize a structure housing special air conditioning
equipment as "an enclosure closely combined with machinery,"
emphasizing the taxpayer's failure to show either that the structure
could serve no other purpose or that it would have to be retired
contemporaneously with the equipment contained within.296 Other
decisions have been more sympathetic to the taxpayer. In Adolph
Coors Co.2 7 the credit was permitted for two heavily insulated beer
cellars containing "a honeycomb" of fermentation and storage
tanks. It appears, though there was very little discussion of the
issue, that the most important factors influencing the decision to
include the cellars within the exception were the sheer mass of the
equipment located within the cellar, and the importance of the
insulation in the walls to the maintenance of the temperature re-
quired for proper brewing.
In a more recent decision favorable to the taxpayer, the Court
of Claims in Brown-Forman concluded (among other things)"'8 that
the whiskey maturation facility in question met the "closely com-
bined with" exception because the sheds would need to be retired
contemporaneously with the maze of whiskey barrel ricks they con-
tained. This is much more liberal than the Commissioner's interpre-
tation of the exception, since the ricks probably could have been
removed with no more difficulty than would have attended the re-
moval of the growing beds from the mushroom house; in addition,
there was certainly not the same degree of interrelationship of func-
tion and interdependence of design between the maturation sheds
and whiskey ricks as there was between the metal-concrete enclo-
sures and the generators and turbines at the hydroelectric facility.
The Commissioner received an equally unpleasant jolt from the
judicial resolution of the status of Melvin Satrum 'S299 automated
henhouses. After concluding that there was no disqualifying human
working space in these facilities (because, to mix a metaphor, the
lion's share of the work was being done by chickens), the Tax Court
noted that the Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1971 Reve-
nue Act"' stated that specific design of a structure to provide for the
demands of equipment which it houses and lack of any other practi-
295. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 75 (1972).
296. See also William K. Coors, 60 T.C. 368 (1973) (a "saw room" containing the
machinery to remove the tops of wooden cartons used by a brewery does not come within the
exception because its useful life does not mirror the useful life of the sawing equipment).
297. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 (1968).
298. The court also held that the sheds were qualifying storage facilities, and were in
addition "essentially items of equipment." See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
299. See notes 240-43 supra and accompanying text.
300. 1971 REPORT, supra note 189, at 29-30.
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cal use are important factors in determining that a structure is not
a "building." The Tax Court found that the presence of these fac-
tors made the henhouse an integral part of the producing process
and thus concluded it was not a building. This is a very significant
loosening of the "closely related exception," expanding it from a
structure built so closely around machinery that it must be torn
down to get that machinery out (the Service's view) to encompass
virtually any structure specially designed to serve as an integral part
of some manufacturing, production, or extraction process. If Satrum
marks the beginning of a judicial trend, the emphasis in the future
will rest much more heavily on the positive elements of uniqueness
of design and features than on such negative aspects as unsuitability
for other uses and impossibility of removal of property contained
inside. 301
These problems with the breadth of the two special purpose
exceptions are most perplexing. Unfortunately, they are not the only
problems with the exceptions. Assume, for example, that a structure
is found not to be a building because it falls within the first special
purpose exception in the regulations as "essentially an item of
machinery or equipment." Is the structure to be classed as "tangible
personal property?" The regulations state that "all property which
is in the nature of machinery" is tangible personal property; 32 but
the regulations also provide that "'tangible personal property'
means any tangible property except land and improvements there-
to, such as buildings or other inherently permanent structures. '30 3
Although the hypothesized structure is not a technical "building"
it probably does have the earmarks of inherent permanence. This
presents an annoying riddle: the structure must be tangible personal
property, but it cannot be. The Service has not handed down a
ruling dealing with the problem, since the structures allowed the
credit by the rulings as "essentially items of machinery or equip-
ment" were all employed in activities which would have qualified
them for the credit even if they had been "other tangible prop-
301. A dissenting judge, adopting the Service's position in the mushroom house and
factory ruling, complained that this approach placed undue emphasis on special design: "In
any modem commercial operation, whether it be producing eggs, cows' milk, or manufactur-
ing television sets, the building which houses the operation may be specially designed for
that purpose. Its utility for any other purpose will be limited. The equipment in question will
be attached to the building. None of these considerations make the structure any less a
building as the term is commonly understood." CCH TAx CT. REP. 32,665 at 2757 (1974)
(Quealy, J., dissenting). And if there were any doubt of the matter after the amendment of
the regulations, Satrum makes clear that the structure need not house machinery to come
within the "closely related" exception: by no feat of semantics can double-decker coops for
20,000 chickens, or the chickens themselves be classified as "machinery."
302. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
303. Id.
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erty," 4 and this mooted the issue of personal property vel non.
Suppose, however, that the taxpayer's activity was not a qualifying
one. What if a structure is not a technical "building" because essen-
tially an item of machinery, but the taxpayer's business is the
furnishing of recreation? In such a situation everything would de-
pend on whether the structure was tangible personal property or
not, because tangible personal property qualifies for the credit re-
gardless of the nature of the taxpayer's business activities. The
regulations are ambiguous and contradictory."5
A similar problem arises in the case of a structure which falls
into the second special purpose building exception, for structures
"closely related" to the property contained therein, although the
resolution is simpler since the 1972 amendments to the regulations.
Before the amendments, the regulation spoke of an enclosure "so
closely combined with. . . machinery or equipment,""3 8 raising the
same problem as that presented by the first exception. The present
regulations, however, speak of "a structure which houses property
used as an integral part of an activity specified in section
48(a)(1)(B)(i)"; since section 48(a)(1)(B)(i) is the section setting
forth the activities which qualify other tangible property used as an
integral part thereof for the credit, the issue is mooted. The struc-
ture will by definition qualify for the credit by virtue of the activity.
While a proposition that both special purpose exceptions
should be considered "other tangible property" as a matter of con-
sistency is reasonable and resolves the ambiguity in the regulations,
it is certainly not the only permissible resolution, and would likely
be vigorously opposed by a taxpayer claiming the credit for a struc-
ture "essentially an item of machinery" not engaged in one of the
activities set forth in section 48(a)(1)(B)(i).
B. Structural Components
(1) Legislative History and Regulations
All items within or attached to a building except for "structural
components" are considered tangible personal property and qualify
for the credit regardless of the nature of the taxpayer's business;0 '
structural components, like "buildings," never qualify. The Techni-
304. All of these items were involved in "manufacturing, production, or extraction."
See text following note 276 supra.
305. Perhaps the best resolution would be to import the rationale employed in Weirick
into this area from the realm of the "inherently permanent structure." See discussion follow-
ing note 65 supra.
306. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1975), supra note 284.
307. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
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cal Explanations did not define the term "structural components,"
but listed "central air-conditioning and heating systems, plumbing,
and electric wiring and lighting fixtures, relating to the operation
and maintenance of the building""3 8 as examples of items compre-
hended by the term. The original regulations similarly avoided any
attempt to define "structural components," but did repeat the char-
acterization "components relating to the operation or maintenance
of a building," and provided a comprehensive list of examples."9
The Revenue Act of 1964310 overruled the Commissioner's stance on
the matter of elevators and escalators, specifically qualifying them
for the credit.311
(2) Classification of "Structural Components"
The largest category of "structural components," and the char-
acterization most often asserted by the Service, is composed of those
items necessary for the "ordinary functions" of a building, an ampli-
fication of the phrasing "relating to the operation or maintenance
of a building" that appears in the Technical Explanations and regu-
lations. One of the earliest examples of this characterization came
in the "mushroom house" ruling.312 The mushrooms were grown in
massive "beds," supported by closely-spaced studs that also sup-
ported a false ceiling containing ventilating equipment. The tax-
308. 1962 TECH. EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 503, 516.
309. The list includes:
walls, partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any permanent coverings therefor such
as paneling or tiling; windows and doors; all components (whether in, on, or adjacent to
the building) of a central air-conditioning or heating system, including motors, compres-
sors, pipes, and ducts; plumbing and plumbing fixtures such as sinks and bathtubs;
electric wiring and lighting fixtures; chimneys; stairs, escalators, and elevators, includ-
ing all components thereof; sprinkler systems; [and] fire escapes ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2) (1975), supra note 284.
310. Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19.
311. The House Ways and Means Committee Report explained: "While these regula-
tions are an accurate interpretation of the intention of Congress last year in this respect,
nevertheless your committee believes that it is appropriate to reconsider the treatment of
elevators and escalators for purposes of the investment credit." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1964-1 (part 2) CUM. BULL. 125, 159. The regulations subsequently were
amended to reflect this change in the status of elevators and escalators, T.D. 6838, 1965-2
CUM. BULL. 9, but otherwise were unchanged from those originally adopted on the matter of
structural components. Predictably, the Service has made much of the Committee's flattering
remark about the accuracy of the regulations' interpretation, often taking the position that
this nod of legislative favor has given its interpretation of "structural components" a status
as elevated as that of Holy Writ.
See, for example, the Service's arguments in King Radio Corp. v. United States, 73-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9766 (10th Cir. 1973); Minot Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970); Fort Walton Square, Inc., 54 T.C. 653 (1970); and Ponderosa
Mouldings, Inc., 53 T.C. 92 (1969).
312. Rev. Rul. 66-156, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 11.
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payer apparently urged that supporting mushroom beds was quite
unrelated to the ordinary functions of buildings, and that the stud-
ding therefore should not be classified as a structural component.
The Service, however, disallowed the credit for the studs because
the studding also supported a ceiling (albeit false) generally consid-
ered necessary for the ordinary operation of a building. Thus, even
if an item serves more than one purpose, the Service will disallow
the credit if one of those purposes is consistent with the notion of
"structural component.2313
The Service employed a similar approach in classifying the
electrical, plumbing, and sprinkler systems at a factory as struc-
tural components, "since they relate generally to the operation of
the building as an overall processing operation system. 31 Simi-
larly, even extra-heavy insulation installed to convert a building
into a cold-storage warehouse was a structural component in the
Service's eyes, because "insulation is a common component of most
buildings. '315
Equally related in the Service's opinion to the ordinary func-
tions, operation, and maintenance of buildings were the custom-
designed glass windows at a racetrack grandstand, together with the
machinery for raising and lowering them, but not the machinery for
washing them.36 Another way to verbalize all this is to identify as
structural components all those items "servicing the overall . . .
needs of the building system, . . . relating generally to the overall
operation of the building," 17 determined by reference to the pla-
tonic archetype of "buildingness" abstracted from the common
characteristics of all buildings.3 18
313. This ruling is criticized as overly strict in Kraus, supra note 287, at 53.
314. Rev. Rul. 66-299, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 14, 16.
315. Rev. Rul. 68-405, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 35, 36. Another taxpayer modernized his
factory by adding heavier insulation to the roof and walls and replacing the floors to accom-
modate newer and heavier machinery, and then cleverly attempted to claim the credit for
only the insulation and reinforcing which he considered to be in excess of the requirements
of a "normal" factory building. The Service would have none of this, concluding that no
allocation was possible in disallowing the credit. Rev. Rul. 69-558, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 5, 6.
This ruling is inconsistent with the decision in Catron and, in light of the published acquies-
ence in that latter case, is possibly no longer reflective of the Service's position. See note 319
infra and accompanying text.
316. Rev. Rul. 69-614, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 8. The Service probably based its decision on
the observation that almost all buildings have windows and equipment for raising and lower-
ing them, but few buildings have integrated equipment for washing their windows. On the
other hand, it could be argued with equal plausibility that very few grandstands have win-
dows, and that very few buildings employ machinery to raise and lower their windows.
317. Rev. Rul. 70-160, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 7, 8 (describing the electrical system of a
building).
318. Or at least all domestic buildings, more precisely (it is doubtful, for example, that
flush toilet facilities would be considered common characteristics of all buildings in certain
developing countries).
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The courts generally have accepted the "relates to the ordinary
functions of buildings" phrasing as a reasonable test for structural
components. In Catron the court disallowed the credit for the "nor-
mal" insulation of a building, although it disagreed with the Com-
missioner's position that the extra insulation installed in the part
of the building employed as a cold storage area was similarly a
structural component." 9 The court distinguished between nonquali-
fying items relating to the ordinary operation of most buildings, and
qualifying items relating to the particular function of a particular
building; the latter category of items are not considered structural
components.
The Central Citrus court also recognized that distinction in
allowing the credit for certain machinery but disallowing it for the
electrical equipment used in the general operation of a fruit process-
ing plant, observing that there was
a clear distinction between property used in the general overall operation of a
building, wherein the credit is disallowed . . . and that property which is
utilized to aid in the employment of a particular function or particular piece
of property. 20
Naturally, this line is sometimes difficult to draw. In Ponderosa
Mouldings, Inc.3 a taxpayer owning a woodworking factory empha-
sized the great risk of fire peculiar to his business to support an
argument that a sprinkler system installed in his factory was too
closely related to the manufacturing process to be considered a
structural component. The Tax Court saw some merit in the conten-
tion, but was persuaded by the Commissioner that, despite the
taxpayer's peculiar need for sprinklers, such systems are common
enough to be considered structural components related to the ordi-
nary functions of commercial buildings.22
A special and prolific subclass of components relating to the
ordinary functions of buildings is heating and air conditioning
equipment, considered. to be structural components in all but the
most extraordinary circumstances. 23 The regulations class only
319. 50 T.C. 306, 316 (1968).
320. 58 T.C. 365, 374 (1972).
321. 53 T.C. 92 (1969).
322. But cf. Rev. Rul. 67-417, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 49, 51 (credit allowed for special fire
extinguisher installed near exhaust hood in kitchen of lunch counter because designed for
"particular hazard"). Occasionally the judiciary has seemed somewhat overenthusiastic in
its application of the "ordinary function-operation and maintenance" test; for example,
C.C. Everhart, CCH TAx CT. REP. 32,241 (1973), concluded that a cesspool located behind
a shopping center was a structural component thereof. This was an alternative holding, the
other being that the cesspool was "other tangible property" not used within a qualifying
activity. Perhaps the court should have confined itself to that latter alternative holding.
323. The original Ways and Means Committee Report spoke of an individual air condi-
tioning unit as tangible personal property (and therefore not a structural component) in
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central air conditioning or heating systems as structural compo-
nents, but a host of rulings have made it plain that the Service's
view of "central" is most expansive; indeed, the taxpayer whose air
conditioning unit strays ever so slightly from the Commissioner's
conception of "individual" will find that the Service is most unsym-
pathetic. The mere fact that an air conditioner is removable without
material damage to either the unit or the building does not preclude
its disqualification as a structural component,M nor is the Service's
conception of "central" restricted to a system which controls a
building's climate from a single unit located in a single place. The
Service maintains that a "central" system may be comprised of a
larger number of units, however attached,32 and that the various
components of the system may be dispersed throughout the building
without removing it from the category of "central. '32 Perhaps the
most extreme example to date is the system classified as "central"
in Fort Walton Square, Inc. 3 1 The taxpayer there had installed
some thirty air conditioners, each with its own heating and cooling
unit, on the roof of his shopping center, with canvas flashing and
ducts connecting the units to the areas to be served. The Tax Court
concluded that these units together constituted a central system,
not individual units, and denied the credit.3 28 It seems that a central
air conditioning and heating system is defined in negative terms:
anything which is not a single window unit is a component of a
central system.
The regulations do provide an escape clause for certain heating
and air conditioning equipment, however:
[T]he term 'structural components' does not include machinery the sole justi-
fication for the installation of which is the fact that such machinery is required
to meet temperature or humidity requirements which are essential for the
operation of other machinery or the processing of materials or foodstuffs. 2'
Equipment may qualify under this "sole justification" test even if
it incidentally provides for employee comfort, or serves to no more
than an insubstantial degree areas where the temperature and hu-
midity requirements are not critical for processing.,' Machinery
thus exempted from the class of structural components by this test
expressing the desire that section 38 property be liberated from the local law of fixtures. 1962
REPORT, 1962-3 CUM. BULL. 405, 415-16.
324. Rev. Rul. 67-359, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 9, 10.
325. Rev. Rul. 67-417, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 49, 51.
326. Rev. Rul. 67-433, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 51-53.
327. 54 T.C. 653 (1970).
328. Accord, Kramertown Co., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1177 (1972).
329. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2) (1975).
330. Id.
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is considered tangible personal property. 31 Some examples of prop-
erty that have been approved for the credit by the Service under
the "sole justification" test are: the ceiling mounted refrigeration
units, evaporation condensers, compressors, and other cooling
equipment installed to convert a building into a cold storage ware-
house, together with the specially installed wiring and switches for
that machinery; 33 and a boiler and steam plant constructed to raise
the humidity within a furniture plant for facilitating the removal of
sawdust from the air . 3 The Tax Court employed the "sole justifica-
tion" test to permit the credit, over the Commissioner's objection,
for the extra insulation installed for converting one end of a quonset
hut to a cold storage area for apples, 34 and for blowers and coolers
installed in "sweet rooms" to control air temperature and humidity,
thus retarding the premature ripening of stored fruit.3 1
The "sole justification" test may provide a very narrow
bolthole, however: one Tax Court decision limited its application
to equipment affecting temperature and humidity, including any
other sort of climate control equipment. This case, William K.
Coors, 31 denied the credit for the duct work of a system installed to
remove foreign particles from air before its release into a beer bot-
tling plant, on the grounds that because this system was used nei-
ther to heat nor cool the building it perforce fell outside the "sole
justification" test. This decision seems clearly erroneous in its dra-
conian interpretation of the exception, and inconsistent with Reve-
nue Ruling 68-530, 331 wherein the Service allowed the credit for cli-
mate control machinery which eliminated dust from the air intro-
duced into "clean rooms" for the testing of sensitive electronic de-
vices. 338 Nevertheless, the Coors decision is symptomatic of the offi-
cial attitude which may often cast the taxpayer in the role of the
fabled camel forced to traverse a needle's eye in his path to the
investment credit.
In addition to the "ordinary function-operation and mainte-
nance" test already discussed, the Service occasionally attempts to
characterize components integrated into, but used for the peculiar
designed purpose of, a building as "structural components." This is
331. Rev. Rul. 69-558, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 5, 6.
332. Rev. Rul. 68-405, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 35-37.
333. Rev. Rul. 70-160, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 7, 8. Compare this result with William K.
Coors, 60 T.C. 368 (1973) and text accompanying note 336 infra.
334. Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
335. Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365, 373-74 (1972).
336. 60 T.C. 368 (1973).
337. 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 37.
338. Concededly the equipment for the "clean rooms" affected temperature as well as
particulate content; nevertheless, the latter function was the significant one.
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in spite of the early ruling which considered the status of certain
property at a bank and which concluded that items attached to the
structure whose removal would affect the operations of the structure
only as a bank (such as vault doors), not as a building, could not
be considered "structural components." '339 It was not long before the
Service lost sight of this distinction. Revenue Ruling 66-156111 classi-
fied the false ceiling in the mushroom house as a structural compo-
nent, although its only purpose was to house equipment used to
create an atmosphere congenial to mushrooms; it was not an ordi-
nary ceiling. Recently, the Service classified as structural compo-
nents canopies attached to a building and which extended out over
loading docks to protect certain inventoried manufacturing parts
from the elements because they related to the ordinary function and
operation of the building. 41 A skeptic might take issue with the
Service's assertion that an ordinary function of a building is to
protect items left outside it. An even more questionable ruling
reached the conclusion that structures for separating the storage
areas assigned to various groups of inventoried parts related to "the
ordinary function and operation of a building.""34 Removal of these
structures would have affected the building's operation as a ware-
house but would not have impeded its operation as a building in the
general sense.
Those rulings represent a subsurface shift in basic tests. Realiz-
ing this, the Service recently recharacterized the test in Revenue
Ruling 74-392,111 classifying loading docks at a factory as structural
components because related "to its operation for its designed pur-
pose as a factory building."3 " Although this latter "designed pur-
pose" test has not been litigated, it is totally inconsistent with the
original "ordinary function" rationale and the earlier conclusion
that vault doors are not structural components precisely because
they were related to the designed purpose of the building as a bank.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this new rationale would seem to
require classification of the heavy machinery installed in a factory
as structural components, because "essential to its operation for its
designed purpose as a factory," a result which is obviously at odds
with the purpose of the credit. Probably the Service would not assert
such an extreme position; nevertheless its consistency with the
339. Rev. Rul. 65-79, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 26.
340. 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 11.
341. Rev. Rul. 74-2, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 10, 11.
342. Rev. Rul. 74-3, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 11-12.
343. 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 33, at 6.
344. Id. at 17.
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"designed purpose" test serves to illustrate the logical difficulty
therewith.
Another argument the Service has used on occasion to broaden
the reach of "structural components" involves a variation of the
same functional analogy attempted with floating docks and trail-
ers:34 5 even if an item is impermanent, it should nevertheless be
considered a structural component if it performs the same function
as its more permanent analog. The reasoning was employed to deny
the credit for an air conditioner in Revenue Ruling 67-359,348 despite
the troublesome fact that the unit could easily be removed. A much
more blatant example, however, is found in Revenue Ruling 69-14,347
in which the Service ruled that movable metal partitions, some
floor-to-ceiling and others of "bank" (5/2 foot) height, were struc-
tural components. The Service reasoned that partitions within a
building do not need to be permanently anchored to perform the
same function as walls; since the partitions were analogous to walls,
the Service proposed to treat them like walls.
In Minot Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United
States"8 the district court totally rejected the Commissioner's anal-
ogy between permanent and impermanent walls, noting that the
reference in the regulations to "walls, partitions, floors and ceilings"
must have been to permanent parts of buildings. The court re-
minded the Commissioner of the embarrassing inconsistency of his
argument with Revenue Ruling 67-349,'31 when the Service had con-
cluded that carpeting was not a structural component because not
permanently attached; if lack of permanence saved the carpeting,
it also saved the partitions from the "structural components" fate.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed,35 observing that because the building
had been constructed and completed without the movable wall divi-
ders, they were no more structural components than were individual
air conditioners.
The Commissioner had no better success with this functional
analogy in King Radio Corp. v. United States,35' which allowed the
credit for similar movable partitions. Indeed, in the King Radio
opinion the Tenth Circuit announced a new "permanence" test for
structural components:
345. See text accompanying notes 114 & 263 supra.
346. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 9.
347. 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 26.
348. 313 F. Supp. 294 (D.N.D.), aff'd 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1970).
349. 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 48.
350. Minot Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir.), affg 313
F. Supp. 294 (D.N.D. 1970).
351. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9766 (10th Cir. 1973).
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We think it was the intent of Congress ... to exclude from the benefits
of [the investment] credit only those [structural components] of a building
which are permanent in the sense that they cannot be removed or relocated
without doing at least temporary damage to the structure itself.3
2
The court concluded that "structural components" should be re-
stricted to items incorporated within the structure "during the con-
struction phase." This test would change the result of the more
restrictive rulings and decisions on removable items, such as air
conditioners heretofore glibly categorized as "central." '353 One diffi-
culty with this new test is the problem of determining the scope of
the "construction phase." Nevertheless, the court's approach prob-
ably comports more closely with the everyday understanding of
"structural components" than does the Commissioner's attempt to
ignore lack of permanence.
354
(3) Some Limited Escape Routes
Even if an item is attached to a building with a certain degree
of permanence and at first glance looks suspiciously like a structural
component, it may still fall within a qualifying exception. One such
escape route is provided for heating and air conditioning equipment
meeting the already discussed "sole justification" test.355 Another
escape is gained by characterizing the item in question as essentially
an item of machinery, or closely combined therewith; although not
mentioned in the regulations, an exception has arisen for such prop-
erty. Whereas the Service will not permit the credit for the general
wiring or plumbing system running through a building, it has stated
on numerous occasions that it will allow the credit for special
connections running directly to a specific item of machinery, con-
ceding that these connections are properly considered parts of
machinery. 36
352. Id. at 82,485. The court also pointed out numerous flaws in the Commissioner's
analogy between walls and these partitions, noting that, unlike walls, these partitions were
neither an integral part of the structure nor did they bear any of the structural load. Id. at
82,484.
353. Such as Rev. Rul. 67-359, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 9, or Fort Walton Square, 54 T.C.
653 (1970).
354. Indeed, there are signs that even the Service concedes the wisdom of the court's
approach; for example, the Service recently placed heavy emphasis on the permanence of a
woodblock flooring laid in a factory in determining that the flooring was a structural compo-
nent. Rev. Rul. 74-391, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 33, at 6. The Service has not asserted this
functional analogy between permanent and impermanent assets since King Radio. Indeed,
it appears from the charge to the jury reported in Fancy Foods of Virginia, Inc. v. United
States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9372 (E.D. Va. 1973), that permanence may now be recognized
by the Service as one of the necessary attributes of "structural components."
355. See text accompanying notes 329-38 supra.
356. Rev. Rul. 70-160, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 7, 8; Rev. Rul. 69-558, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 5,
7; Rev. Rul. 66-299, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 14.
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This exception to the "structural component" rubric is not con-
fined to plumbing and wiring, however: the Service recently ruled
that the credit would be available for a raised floor built over the
existing floor of a factory building to permit the emplacement of
wiring, air conditioning ducts, and other paraphernalia required for
installation of a computer.3 15 The Service concluded that because
the raised floor was a necessary part of the installation and opera-
tion of the computer, it was "essentially an accessory of such
equipment," not a structural component of the factory. 58 This is
something of a retreat from the Service's earlier tough lines with
regard to the false ceiling containing ventilation equipment in the
"mushroom house," or the hermetically sealed walls of the "clean
rooms."
A final and peculiar exception to "structural components" has
been applied thus far only to items of heating equipment leased to
building owners by gas utility taxpayers. Normally, gas storage
tanks, water heaters and softeners, and the associated tubes, fittings
and the like are classified as structural components when perma-
nently installed for use as part of a heating and plumbing system.
The Service recognizes, however, that it would be anomalous to
deny the credit for such items to a utility which merely leases this
equipment to its customers: it seems unfair to disallow the credit
to A's property as a structural component of B's building, and so
the Service permits the utility'to claim the credit where it retains
title to the equipment and it seems reasonably possible that the
apparatus could be removed on the expiration of the lease. 59
C. Conclusion: Building and Structural Components
"Building" and "structural components" have engendered a
disproportionate amount of confusion for an eight word parentheti-
cal exception to otherwise qualifying "other tangible property." The
stakes involved are high: if "other tangible property" can be charac-
terized as a "building," or if accessories can be classified as "struc-
tural components" of a "building," the credit irrevocably is lost,
and no further argument about specialized uses or the policy of the
credit is of any avail. Most of the problems with the term "building"
can be traced to the Service's notion that "appearance" and "func-
tion" should be considered two different tests, and that a structure
357. Rev. Rul. 74-391, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 33, at 6.
358. The same ruling went so far as to hold that catwalks designed and constructed to
provide access for inspection and repair of certain items of equipment would be allowed the
credit as "necessary and identifiable" parts of that equipment.
359. Rev. Rul. 70-236, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 8; Rev. Rul. 69-602, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 6.
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need only meet one to qualify as a technical "building." On the
contrary, a structure should not be classified as a building unless it
passes both tests.360
The confusion is compounded by the attitude evidenced by
both the courts and the Service that the function test, emphasizing
the presence or absence of space for shelter or working areas and
minimizing the importance of a consideration of appearances, is the
determinative test. Function is, of course, important-but this is
not to say that it should be the only relevant consideration; placing
undue weight on function and ignoring physical nature leads to
hypertechnical results (a greenhouse is a building but a henhouse
is not) and to unconvincing distinctions. If Brown-Forman and
Weirick seem excessively solicitous of taxpayers' investments with
their constrictions of "building," they are balanced by the Commis-
sioner's intransigence with respect to the "special purpose" struc-
ture exceptions for edifices "essentially items of machinery" or
"closely related to property used as an integral part of qualifying
activities, which clearly can be expected to be replaced concurrently
with that property." The Commissioner excludes structures from
the first exception if they provide working space, and from the sec-
ond if removal of the equipment contained therein does not necessi-
tate total dismantling of the surrounding structure. Both positions
seem too restrictive.
There is also confusion over the scope of "structural compo-
nents." The earliest rulings applied this characterization only to
those components associated with the ordinary functions of build-
ings generally, such as floors, roofs, permanent walls, and the like,
excluding from this category items related more closely to the par-
ticular use the taxpayer made of the building, such as bank vault
doors. More recently, the Service has moved away from that distinc-
tion, sweeping within "structural components" certain items ob-
viously installed only because of the particular needs of the tax-
payer, such as extra-heavy insulation for conversion of a building to
a cold storage warehouse, and partitions erected within a warehouse
to facilitate the segregation of inventoried parts. This trend has not
been challenged in the courts, but one might speculate that this new
approach would suffer the same judicial fate as did the stretched
functional analogy which attempted to convert portable partitions
into "structural components."
Equally at variance with the policy of the credit is the Service's
overly expansive interpretation of "central" air conditioning, and
360, To illustrate, an adoption of this view would have precluded the surprising ruling
that a craneway was a "building."
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the sort of limited reasoning which excludes air cleaning equipment
from the "sole justification" test for climate control machinery on
the grounds that such cleaning machinery affects neither tempera-
ture nor humidity. The area might be less encumbered with techni-
cal traps for the unwary if the Service would make wider use of the
sort of realistic approach which permitted the credit for raised floor-
ing and catwalks installed to facilitate the operation of a computer.
These items related to the taxpayer's particular activities, not to the
"ordinary functions" of buildings, and were properly excluded from
the category of "structural components."
VI. CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY FOR SECTION 38
PROBLEMS
The identification of section 38 property is a complicated and
often frustrating task. Despite such optimistic pronouncements in
the legislative history to the effect that tangible personal property
would not be construed narrowly, or that "building" would be ac-
corded its commonly understood meaning, the law has developed
otherwise. The Service is most reluctant to classify assets as tangi-
ble personal property, it seems, and the term "building" is so en-
crusted with legal barnacles as to be unrecognizable. Rather than
wandering once more through the details of the law underlying (and
sometimes overgrowing) the various definitional concepts of section
38 property, it would seem more profitable to concentrate on trends
which seem to be, or perhaps should be, developing in some of the
more troublesome areas.
A. Consideration of Form, Function, and Permanence
The key to understanding section 38 property is an appreciation
of the proper interrelationship between form, function, and perma-
nence. Much of the confusion in the area stems, for example, from
the Service's free-wheeling employment of the "inherently perma-
nent structure" characterization. Few would argue that a perma-
nent, nonfloating dock is an inherently permanent structure. Prob-
lems are created, however, when there is an attempt to apply the
same appellation to a floating dock simply because it performs the
same function as a nonfloating one: although the function is the
same, the form and degree of permanence differ. The proper resolu-
tion, as adopted by the courts, is to apply a different characteriza-
tion. Similarly, the simple fact that an item is attached to the realty
does not compel the conclusion that it is an "inherently permanent
structure:" it has the form of one, since it is so attached, but inquiry
must still be made into its function and degree of permanence. The
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courts have demonstrated an appreciation of this. Finally, even
though an item seems to be an improvement to land because perma-
nently annexed to the realty, it still should not necessarily be char-
acterized as "other tangible property": like the chair lift towers in
Weirick, an inquiry into form and function may indicate that it is
nevertheless tangible personal property because it is essentially an
item of machinery. It is further suggested that Weirick's resolution
of this issue-that an inherently permanent structure which is es-
sentially an item of machinery should be considered tangible per-
sonal property-is the correct resolution, and that Roberts was erro-
neously decided.
Nor should this tripartite inquiry into form, function, and per-
manence be confined to inherently permanent structures. A realiza-
tion that there was more to the inquiry than simply an examination
of function led to the very sensible results in Minot and King Radio
that movable wall partitions are not structural components. How-
ever, it is submitted that the rationale expressed in King Radio to
the effect that permanence is the sole relevant consideration com-
mits again the error of tunnel-vision, differing from the Service's
discredited position in those cases only by a substitution of the
permanence tunnel for the functional one.
B. The Function Fallacy
The confusion over the proper role of function probably stems
from the emphasis placed on that factor in decisions and rulings
dealing with storage facilities. 31' Most of these devoted virtually
their entire attention to an analysis of this one factor. But this does
not mean that they stand for the proposition that an inquiry into
function is the only pat answer to all section 38 property problems.
Indeed, a little reflection demonstrates that in the particular area
of storage facilities (or facilities for the bulk storage of fungible
commodities, as they are now styled) function plays the leading role
because it is the only variable in the equation: form and permanence
are constants. That is, almost all storage facilities are walled struc-
tures with roofs, of sturdy construction. Thus, there is no reason to
inquire into form and permanence with this type of property, and
361. For example, consider the following language from Satrum: "While the legislative
history of the investment credit indicates that 'building' is to be given its commonly accepted
meaning [citations omitted], it is clear that the courts have long concluded that certain
structures, though outwardly resembling buildings were not considered so for purposes of
section 48(a)(1)(B). Brown & William Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283
(W.D. Ky. 1973) (tobacco sheds), and Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968) (refrigerated
portion of corrugated metal quonset hut)." CCH TAX CT. REP. 32,665 at 2755 (1974). Note
that both cases cited by the court were decisions involving storage facilities.
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therefore the attention is quite rightly centered on function. To the
extent, however, that form and permanence do begin to vary as the
consideration moves on to other types of assets, then these elements
must also be examined.
So it is with buildings which are not storage facilities. Here,
permanence is assumed. Form and function vary greatly, however,
from structure to structure. Decisions purporting to examine only
one of these two variables omit a vital step in the analysis. The truth
of this proposition is borne out by the Technical Explanations to the
1962 Revenue Act which describe a building in terms of both ap-
pearance and function, implying that both criteria must be satisfied
before a structure is classed as a "building." The Technical Explan-
ations stated that "building" was to be given its ordinary and com-
monly understood meaning, save only in the case of the exceptions
for storage facilities and structures in the nature of machinery. Does
a craneway comport with the common understanding of the term
"building"? No. It was erroneously classified as such because the
Service refused to examine form, preferring to restrict the analysis
to function.
If any sense is to be made of the "building" area, future deci-
sions must take account of the fact that the basic analysis of the
section 38 property question should include consideration of all
three elements-permanence, form, and function. The corollary to
this is that since permanence is assumed in the case of a structure
which is arguably a "building, ' 32 the consideration should be nar-
rowed to form and function only. The further corollary that in the
case of storage facilities function alone is examined is applicable
only to storage facilities, because there, and only there, can both
form and permanence be assumed and regarded as constants.
C. The Methodology
A more satisfactory resolution to the chaotic area of "buildings"
might proceed as follows. First, both form and function are crucial:
no structure which is fundamentally at variance with the common
understanding of a building in terms of appearance should be classi-
fied as one for the purposes of the investment credit. This would
change the whimsical holdings in the instances of the craneway and
"clean rooms." If, however, a structure is found to bear the physical
earmarks of a building after consideration of its form (and this
would include roofless sports arenas that, it is suggested, are gener-
362. This is not always so, of course: if the subject is a trailer then permanence must
be examined, as the court properly did in Joseph H. Moore, and the Service improperly failed
to in Rev. Rul. 67-156, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 7.
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ally thought of as buildings), then the structure should be classified
as a "building" unless an analysis of its function demonstrates that
it falls within one of four exceptions. The first two exceptions are
those provided in the statute for research and storage facilities,
which must function as such in connection with certain qualifying
activities to be eligible for the credit. The third and fourth excep-
tions are the "special purpose structure" exemptions now found in
the regulations in section 1.48-1(e)(1): structures which are essen-
tially items of machinery, and those which are closely related to
property used as an integral part of a qualifying activity.
To dispel prior ambiguities, it should be made clear that struc-
tures which are essentially items of machinery should be considered
tangible personal property, consistent with Weirick's resolution of
the problem with less building-like inherently permanent struc-
tures, because of the statement in the regulations that all items in
the nature of machinery are tangible personal property."' This
means that structures coming within this exception are freed from
the restrictions of employment only in a qualifying activity, and so
need not be used as an integral part of manufacturing, production,
etc. It is suggested that since such structures are equipment, allow-
ance of the credit for them regardless of use comports with the policy
of the statute.64 Structures meeting the other, "closely combined
with" exception should be considered "other tangible property"
since they are by definition less machine-like. Although the Com-
missioner's present "total dismantling for removal of the property
inside" test for this exception should be abandoned as too restric-
tive, the exception should not be thrown open to all structures con-
taining property used as integral part of manufacturing, etc.: as the
regulations presently provide, a structure should meet this excep-
tion only on a showing of real interrelationship with the property
contained therein. As the regulations state, factors evidencing such
a special interrelationship would be peculiar design for the stress
and other demands of equipment housed within, and the relative
costs of conversion to other uses.
What would the results have been in some of the more recent
litigation if this methodology had been applied? Brown-Forman's
whiskey sheds would have qualified for the credit, but as storage
facilities: it is submitted that the storing while aging of a vast
quantity of whiskey in oaken barrels is the bulk storage of a fungible
363. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1975).
364. For example, even if the nation's industrial base is not boosted by the employment
of this property in fabricating industries, those industries nevertheless receive a tonic by
virtue of manufacturing this property.
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commodity. But Brown-Forman's statements that the sheds are not
buildings should be repudiated: they are buildings, but are permit-
ted the credit because they are a special class of buildings. The
Satrum henhouses, however, present a different case. Certainly, the
henhouses passed the appearance test: they looked like buildings.
To qualify for the credit, they must then meet one of the four excep-
tions. They are pretty clearly neither research nor storage facilities.
It seems fanciful to argue that they are machinery. They must qual-
ify or not, then, on the closeness of their relation to the property
contained inside. Although the Tax Court made some rather ques-
tionable observations about the primacy of function over all other
considerations, it seems to have been on the right track in conclud-
ing "there is little doubt in our mind that the structure was specially
designed as an integral part of the egg-producing process. '3 15 The
court discussed at some length the peculiar features of the structure,
such as louvered walls and sloping floor for easy washing and drain-
age; the court observed further that the henhouse could not be used
for any purpose except for the quartering of chickens, and noted that
replacement of the entire facility reasonably could be expected if the
property housed inside were abandoned. The difficulty with the case
is that one suspects that the court has overstated the importance of
the interrelationship between the henhouse and the egg process: was
this henhouse really any more closely and inextricably related to
property used as an integral part of manufacturing or production
than were the greenhouses in Sunnyside and Thirup? The Senate
Report on which this exception is based refers to an automated hog-
raising facility, describing it in such terms that one receives the
impression of a robot hog-raising machine. The Tax Court felt that
the henhouse was of similar character. It is suggested that if this
henhouse is indeed within this exception, it is only barely within it.
A much more convincing example would be the beer cellars in
Adolph Coors, literally crammed with brewing equipment and
heavy insulation functioning as indispensible parts of the brewing
process. But while we may have some doubts about a factual judg-
ment call made in a close case, the Tax Court's methodology in
Satrum may well stand as a harbinger of a recognition that form,
function, and permanence must be considered together in any sec-
tion 38 property question.
Twelve full years have elapsed since section 38 property made
its first appearance on the stage of tax law. In those twelve years, a
complicated, confusing, ad hoc, and often inconsistent body of rul-
365. CCH TAX CT. REP. 32,665 at 2755 (1974).
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ings and judicial decisions has grown up around the definitional
regulation; words and phrases have acquired strange new meanings
and connotations in the lush overgrowth of legal reasoning clinging
to that regulation. The paradoxes in the regulation (such as that
addressed in Weirick) and, more often, the ambiguities resulting
from an almost universal failure by the regulations to define, in-
stead of simply illustrate, its terms (such as "inherently permanent
structure," "structural component," "building," and the rest) per-
haps make inconsistency in and confusion over interpretation inevi-
table. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the practitioner, the Serv-
ice, and the courts could bring some order into the chaos of section
38 property by developing and consistently applying a single metho-
dology of analysis, such as the tripartite consideration of form, func-
tion, and permanence suggested herein, which would provide an
underlying foundation of logic and common sense for the area in
which such a foundation heretofore has been sorely missed.
5.A. CRAGWALL, JR.
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